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Showing posts with label mortgage defaults. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mortgage defaults. Show all posts

Friday, May 13, 2011

Wells Fargo's "Seventeen Worthless Mortgages"

Foxx_(2009.04.02)
COMMENTARY: by JONATHAN FOXX
Jonathan Foxx is a former Chief Compliance Officer of two publicly traded financial institutions, and the President and Managing Director of Lenders Compliance Group, the nation’s first full-service, mortgage risk management firm in the country.

On March 1, 2011, the US Court of Appeals (Fourth Circuit) filed a Per Curiam opinion. In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Old Republic Title Insurance Company, Wells Fargo sought to recover the value of "seventeen worthless mortgages" - the Court's own words! - it purchased from Financial Mortgage, Inc. (FMI), a mortgage banker, in the secondary mortgage market. The scheme involved Title Pro, an agent of Old Republic, colluding with FMI to fraudulently close the real estate transactions underlying Wells Fargo's mortgages. Wells Fargo claimed that Old Republic was contractually bound to indemnify Wells Fargo for its losses. 
The Court ruled in favor of Old Republic! Let's learn why.

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Commentary and Outline
This Commentary offers a brief outline. I am leaving out citations, where possible, for ease of reading. This outline is not meant to be comprehensive, authoritative, or relied upon for legal advice. It offers only a brief synopsis of the argumentation. For citations, exhibits, and argumentation, read the judicial decision (below).
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The Scheme
FMI originated mortgages and drew on its warehouse lines from several financial institutions. After the warehouse lenders advanced funds to FMI for a mortgage loan, FMI would then sell the mortgage to secondary investors, use the proceeds to pay back the warehouse lenders, and thereby replenish its lines of credit.
So far, so good.
But this is where the plot thickens.
Beginning May 2004, Wells Fargo entered into a standard Loan Purchase Agreement with FMI. This Agreement set forth the terms required by Well Fargo to purchase from FMI numerous residential mortgage loans secured by a note and deed of trust on real property, properly recorded and free from prior liens.
However, the very mortgages purchased by Wells Fargo from FMI failed at their inception, because FMI misrepresented to Wells Fargo that the mortgages were recorded in Virginia's public records system, providing Wells Fargo with first and exclusive priority over all other creditors. Eventually, Wells Fargo discovered that it actually had unsecured and/or subordinate positions on these loans, because they were not recorded nor free from the prior liens.
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An Agency Agreement       
Old Republic, like most title insurance companies, appoints agents to act on its behalf to sign, countersign and issue commitments, binders, title reports, certificates, guarantees, title insurance policies, endorsements, and other agreements under which the insurer assumes liability for the condition of title.
In Old Republic's Agency Agreement with TitlePro, the latter was expressly prohibited from acting as an agent of Old Republic when, on some occasions, TitlePro might serve as a settlement agent. That is, when TitlePro performed such services, the Agency Agreement expressly prohibits TitlePro from acting as an agent of Old Republic.
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FMI and TitlePro - Two Ways to Collude
Version One (Variations on a Theme) - 3 Bogus Mortgages
1) FMI secures a buyer of land or a refinancing opportunity.
2) FMI then sends the necessary mortgage documents to TitlePro.
2) TitlePro then uses the loan documents to create the appearance of loan closings (i.e., completing a HUD-1 Settlement Statement, et cetera).
3) TitlePro is now able to obtain funds from FMI's warehouse lenders (which does not include Wells Fargo).
4) After obtaining the funds, TitlePro fails to use those funds to clear title or pay off the pre-existing mortgage.
5) TitlePro transfers the funds to FMI.
6) For many transactions, FMI also creates multiple, unrecorded "first" mortgages on each property by having borrowers sign multiple sets of "original" loan documents at closing. (I'll call these "first" mortgages "bogus mortgages.")
7) FMI fabricates the notes.
8) FMI sells these unrecorded bogus mortgages to several secondary investors, including Wells Fargo.
9) In each of these transactions, FMI fails: (a) to disclose the existence of the other bogus mortgages with prior liens to purchasers of these mortgages and (b) to record the mortgages it subsequently sold.
10) Wells Fargo deals with FMI exclusively, sending payment for the notes directly to FMI's accounts.
11) Wells Fargo does not interact with TitlePro or Old Republic in any way.
Version Two - 14 Bogus Mortgages
1) TitlePro fills out a HUD-1 Settlement Statement and receives loan proceeds from the warehouse lender.   
2) The HUD-1 Settlement Statements requires TitlePro to use these funds to pay off the prior mortgages on the properties.
3) TitlePro fails to pay off the prior mortgages and release them of record.
4) TitlePro also fails to record the new mortgage in favor of FMI that "secured" the notes eventually sold to Wells Fargo.
5) In each of these transactions, FMI fails: (a) to disclose the existence of the other bogus mortgages with prior liens to purchasers of these mortgages and (b) to record the mortgages it subsequently sold.
6) Old Republic does not issue policies on these transactions, because Old Republic's Commitment letters requires the prior mortgages to be "paid and released of record" as a condition of issuing the title insurance policies.
7) For some of these transactions, Old Republic also issues a standard-form closing protection letter (CPL), agreeing to reimburse FMI for losses arising out of an issuing agent's misconduct in closing a transaction.
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Scammed!
Wells Fargo now possesses seventeen worthless mortgages, all of which are presently in default.
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District Court
When Wells Fargo began this action back in March 2009, it alleged six claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) a business conspiracy in violation of Virginia Code; (3) common law civil conspiracy; (4) fraud; (5) violations of Virginia's Wet Settlement Act, and (6) negligence. For all but the breach of contract claims, Wells Fargo alleged that TitlePro acted as Old Republic's agent when it closed the disputed transactions.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Old Republic because:
1) It rejected Wells Fargo's contention that Virginia's Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (CRESPA) made Old Republic liable, reasoning that CRESPA does no more than authorize non-attorneys, including title agents, who meet specific statutory conditions to serve as settlement agents.
2) It held that TitlePro did not have actual agency authority because the Agency Agreement explicitly prohibited TitlePro from acting as a settlement agent on Old Republic's behalf.
3) In accordance with Virginia law, it rejected Wells Fargo's theory of apparent authority, reasoning that Wells Fargo did not reasonably rely on Old Republic's conduct or statements allegedly cloaking TitlePro with apparent authority to act as a settlement agent on Old Republic's behalf.   
For these reasons, the District Court also granted summary judgment to Old Republic on the conspiracy, Wet Settlement Act, and fraud claims.
Plus:
4) The District Court rejected the breach of contract claim, reasoning that Old Republic could assert the same defenses against Wells Fargo as it could against the assignor of the contract, FMI, and one such defense -- fraud -- shielded it from contractual liability. (The District Court also ruled that the negligence claim failed because, in negligence claims, the common law duty protecting person or property does not extend to Wells Fargo's acquisition of worthless notes. Wells Fargo did not challenge this holding on appeal.)
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Appeals Court
Wells Fargo appealed, arguing that:
(1) an assertedly "ambiguous" agency agreement and Old Republic's course of conduct raise genuine issues of material fact as to the scope of TitlePro's agency;
(2) the District Court misinterpreted CRESPA;
(3) TitlePro furthered the conspiracy by issuing title insurance instruments, as authorized by Old Republic, thus making the latter liable in conspiracy; and,
(4) a provision in Old Republic's title insurance policy absolved Wells Fargo (an innocent purchaser for value) of any fraud-based defenses Old Republic may have against FMI.
Yet the Appeals Court upheld the District Court's ruling. Why?
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Back to that Agency Agreement
So, why did the Appeals Court affirm the District Court?
Because there are two provisions of the Agency Agreement, though seeming to conflict with each other, which rather serve separate, but complementary ends.
On one hand, a section requires TitlePro to record documents "necessary to insure the interest," not every document necessary to close the transaction. The primary purpose of this settlement-like duty is to "minimize the risk of loss under the title insurance policies," not create a general agency relationship capturing all the agent's settlement activities.
On the other hand, in another section, Old Republic unequivocally withholds consent for TitlePro to act as an agent when TitlePro performs "any escrow, closing or settlement" services. Courts throughout the country, including those interpreting Virginia law, agree that such an express limitation on agency duties controls.
Accordingly, Wells Fargo ran out of luck and Old Republic was off the hook.
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Justice Served?
On November 13, 2008, the owner of FMI, Vijay Taneja, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of federal law and received a sentence of 84 months imprisonment, to be followed by three-years of supervised release.
But what about that little matter of those "seventeen worthless mortgages?"
Click for the Per Curiam Opinion.

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What do you think?
I would welcome your comments.
Please feel free to email me at any time.
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Monday, June 28, 2010

FANNIE MAE: Attacking Strategic Defaults

Overview

On June 23, 2010, Fannie Mae announced a change to its "waiting period" policy for prior foreclosures. Heretofore, the waiting period that must elapse after a borrower experiences a foreclosure is seven years. However, Fannie Mae allowed a shorter time period - five years - if certain additional requirements were met (i.e., minimum down payment, credit score, and occupancy requirements).

These requirements have now been modified to remove the five year option. Unless the foreclosure was the result of documented extenuating circumstances, which only requires a three-year waiting period (with additional requirements), all borrowers will now be required to meet a seven-year waiting period after a prior foreclosure to be eligible for a new mortgage loan eligible for sale to Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae's policies for extenuating circumstances remain unchanged (see: Selling Guide, 133-5.3-08, Extenuating Circumstances for Derogatory Credit).

The policy change, effective October 1, 2010, reflects Fannie's commitment to reduce the growing epidemic of strategic defaults.

The policy change was announced at the same time that Fannie put forth a News Release entitled Seven-Year Lockout Policy for Strategic Defaulters. In the announcement, Fannie stated that the changes are designed to encourage borrowers to work with their servicers and pursue alternatives to foreclosure, and specifically stating that defaulting borrowers who walk-away and had the capacity to pay or did not complete a workout alternative in good faith will be ineligible for a new Fannie Mae-backed mortgage loan for a period of seven years from the date of foreclosure.

Borrowers with extenuating circumstances who work out one of the foreclosure alternatives with their servicer could be eligible for a new mortgage loan in three years and in as little as two years depending on the circumstances. However, Fannie will also take legal action to recoup the outstanding mortgage debt from borrowers who strategically default on their loans in jurisdictions that allow for deficiency judgments.

Highlights
Strategic Default Epidemic

A strategic default is the decision by a borrower to stop making payments (i.e., defaulting) on a debt despite having the financial ability to make the payments. This is particularly associated with residential and commercial mortgages. Strategic defaults usually occur after a substantial drop in the house's price such that the debt owed is greater than the value of the property (a negative equity condition called "underwater") and is expected to remain so for the foreseeable future.

Borrowers that stop making mortgage payments despite having the ability to pay have traditionally been called "walkaways" - the new term being "strategic defaulters."

Strategic defaults account for almost one-third of all defaults (31% in March 2010), according to research conducted by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and the Kellogg School of Management. Experian places this statistic at nearly one in five mortgage defaults through the first half of 2009.

More and more defaults are considered "strategic" - where borrowers choose to "walk away" from underwater mortgage obligations regardless of their ability to pay - although to what extent is still up for debate as the two studies cited above demonstrate.

Waiting Period After A Foreclosure

Fannie-Chart (Foreclosure)

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Walking Away

There are two lines of thinking about strategic defaults. One position argues that the borrower has a duty to make payments on debt if the ability to pay is intact. The other position argues that there is no such duty, a loan being a contract between consenting adults, and further noting that financial investors (especially commercial mortgagors) routinely default on non-recourse loans that have negative equity without retaliation from the mortgagee.

In fact, there is an extreme view that argues there is a moral duty to strategically default based on the fact that one should make such decisions based on one's financial interest "unclouded by unnecessary guilt or shame", as lenders who do not modify mortgages do the same, "seek[ing] to maximize profits or minimize losses irrespective of concerns of morality or social responsibility," or to put it more bluntly, stating that "the economy is fundamentally amoral."

Further, obligations to honor a contract are balanced by obligations to oneself and one's family, the latter speaking in favor of strategic default, some arguing "You need to put yourself and your family's finances first," while one also has obligations to a community, which may be damaged by default.

Economist Paul Krugman has noted that strategic defaults will happen after a housing bubble bursts. Many other economists take a similar view. This is consistent with studies and anecdotal information which conclude that most defaults are driven by house equity falling to below the value of the mortgage, combined with a major downward shock to income (i.e., loss of wages).

Of course, foreclosure of the borrower's house will result in a negative credit rating, possibly making obtaining loans in the future more difficult or more expensive for the borrower. With otherwise good credit a new mortgage from US government agencies will be denied until 3 (FHA), and, with the new Fannie announcement, to 7 years (FNMA) have passed since the actual date of foreclosure if extenuating circumstances cannot be proven.

Fannie is updating the additional requirements that apply to borrowers with documented extenuating circumstances to reflect a maximum LTV ratio of the lesser of 90% or the LTV ratio per the Eligibility Matrix for all transactions.

Jurisdictional Variances

Effects vary by jurisdiction: different states in the United States treat default on mortgage debt differently, often depending on whether the mortgage debt is recourse debt or non-recourse debt (i.e., meaning whether the mortgage lender can pursue claims against the defaulted debtor).

Furthermore, mortgage refinancing may be treated differently from a purchase money mortgage, and mortgages on second homes may be treated differently from mortgages on primary residences.

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Underwriting Borrowers with a Prior Foreclosure
Fannie Mae: SEL-2010-08
June 23, 2010

Tuesday, June 15, 2010

OTS: Fraud and Insider Abuse

Overview

The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued a revised Examination Handbook on Fraud and Insider Abuse on June 14, 2010. Substantive changes include:

  • adding a discussion on Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) reporting requirements and the applicability of the "Safe Harbor" provisions for SAR filers;
  • adding a discussion on the FDIC's white paper entitled, "Impact of New Activities and Structures on Bank Failures" and highlighted factors that contributed to the four costliest institution failures from 1997 through 2002;
  • providing updated statistics and red flags on mortgage fraud, identity theft, check fraud and payment card fraud;
  • adding a discussion on fraud risk management and detection methods based on AICPA guidance; and,
  • streamlining the internal controls section.

In 2009, the President elevated the fight against mortgage fraud to a cabinet-level priority and expanded the task force to include OTS, OCC, the Federal Reserve, The Federal Housing Finance Agency, HUD, and the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program.

The President's task force joined the work that the Federal Trade Commission had already begun with their "Operation Stolen Hope" program to crack down on mortgage foreclosure rescue and loan modification scams.

Given more recent concerns like mortgage fraud, consumer loan fraud and identity theft, SARs data is more important than ever. Law enforcement agencies use the information reported on the SARs to initiate investigations and the agencies use the information in their examination and oversight of supervised institutions. The usefulness of the SAR database depends on the completeness and accuracy of the reported information.

Accordingly, we advise you to be sure that your institution is accurately and fully completing SARs.

Highlights

Appraisal Abuse Red Flags

  • No appraisal or property evaluation in file.
  • Mortgage broker or borrowers that always use the same appraiser.
  • Appraiser bills association for more than one appraisal when there is only one in the file.
  • Unusual appraisal fees (high or low).
  • No history of property or prior sales records.
  • Market data located away from subject property.
  • Unsupported or unrealistic assumptions relating to capitalization rates, zoning change, utility availability, absorption, or rent level.
  • Valued for highest and best use, which is different from current use.
  • Appraisal method using retail value of one unit in condo complex multiplied by the number of units equals collateral value.
  • Use of superlatives in appraisals.
  • Appraisal made for borrower.
  • Appraisals performed or dated after loan.
  • Close relationship between builder, broker, appraiser, lender and/or borrower.
  • Overvalued (inflated) or high property value.

Mortgage Fraud Red Flags

Straw Borrower Schemes

  • Borrowers purchasing property described as a primary residence, but outside of their home states, or located an unreasonable commuting distance from their stated employers.
  • A quit claim deed is used either right before, or soon after, loan closing.
  • Investment property is represented as owner-occupied.
  • Someone signed on the borrower's behalf.
  • Names were added to the purchase contract.
  • Sales involve a relative or related party.
  • No sales agent involved.
  • Indication of default by the property seller.
  • High FICO score.
  • Power of attorney for borrowers.
  • Good assets, but gift used as down payment.
  • Repository alerts on credit report.

Flipping Schemes

  • Fraudulent appraisal.
  • Inflated buyer income.
  • Ownership changes two or more times in a brief period of time.
  • Two or more closings occur almost simultaneously.
  • The property has been owned for a short time by the seller.
  • The property seller is not on the title.
  • There is a reference to double escrow or other HUD-1 form.

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Fraud and Insider Abuse
Regulatory Bulletin, RB 37-54 (May 18, 2010)
Revised: June 14, 2010

Wednesday, May 19, 2010

HAMP: APRIL LOAN MODIFICATION REPORT

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Overview

On May 17, 2010, the U. S. Department of the Treasury and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) released April 2010 data for the Obama Administration's Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) showing permanent modifications for almost 300,000 homeowners - an increase of 68,000 or almost 13 percent over March.

New in this month's report is information about servicer-specific conversion rates to permanent modifications and servicer performance in giving homeowners timely decisions. The data show that there is wide variation among servicers in these areas, further demonstrating the need for transparency regarding servicer performance.

Highlights

Almost 300,000 permanent modifications -
An Increase of 68,000

  • Borrowers in permanent modifications are experiencing a median payment reduction of 36%, more than $500 per month.
  • Over 68,000 trial modifications converted to permanent modifications in April, an increase of almost 13% from March.

Servicers Begin to Require Upfront Documentation

  • In order to comply with Treasury guidelines that take effect on June 1, in March 2010 servicers began collecting upfront documentation from borrowers prior to initiating new trial modifications.
  • Treasury is monitoring servicer performance closely to ensure that borrower demand is met and that servicers are reviewing modification requests in a timely manner.

Resolutions to Borrowers
Who Entered Trials Before January 1, 2010

  • Common causes of cancellations include missed trial payments and incomplete or unverifiable documentation.

New This Month
Conversion Rates By Servicer

  • Servicers show wide variation in conversion rates as measured against trials eligible to convert.
  • Servicers who started trials with verified documents generally posted higher conversion rates than servicers who allowed borrowers to enter trials with stated income. With recent Treasury guidance, all servicers are now verifying borrower documents before trial start.
  • Using stated income upon trial starts, the four largest participating servicers have conversion rates below 30%.

New This Month
Aged Trial Modifications by Servicer

  • Servicers show wide variation in completing timely decisions on trial modifications.

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Making Home Affordable Program
Servicer Report
April 2010 (05/17/10)

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Thursday, February 25, 2010

Excessive Defaults and the Future of FHA

by Jonathan Foxx

Jonathan Foxx, former Chief Compliance Officer of two publicly traded financial institutions, is the President and Managing Director of Lenders Compliance Group.

As published in the February 2010 Edition of National Mortgage Professional Magazine.

New Sheriff in Town

There’s a new Sheriff in town. It’s about time and none too soon! These folks mean business!

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is determined to move forward with strong actions to reduce defaults and claims that are dragging down the FHA mortgage insurance program. Guided by the firm resolve of its new HUD Secretary, Shaun Donovan, and the FHA Commissioner, David H. Stevens, new ways and means are being implemented to put FHA’s future on a much stronger foundation.

The FHA capital reserve ratio, which measures reserves held in excess of those needed to cover projected losses over the next 30 years, has fallen below the congressionally mandated 2 percent threshold to 0.53 percent.[i] To give some sense of the steepness of this decline, at the end of 2007 the ratio was at 6.4% and at the end of 2008 it was at 3% and, at that time, forecasted to fluctuate through 2015 between 2.8 and 2.9 percent -- with only a worst case scenario leading to a ratio below 2 percent.[ii]

Obviously, the worst case scenario has arrived!

FHA currently has $31 billion in total reserves, triple in size from last year, due to taking on more risk as private industry sources for financing has dissipated. This amounts to 4.5 percent of total insurance-in-force. But with mortgage defaults at an all time high, and other dispositive factors, FHA’s capital reserve ratio is now at 0.53% [iii] -- the lowest in history. Clearly, the day of reckoning is here.[iv]

HUD’s Secretary Shaun Donovan and FHA Commissioner David H. Stevens have said there will be no request for congressional action to subsidize the rapidly depleting fund, even though under normal economic scenarios the ratio might rise to only 1.1 percent in fiscal 2010, but could dip to -1.03 percent if there is a significant drop in mortgage rates that cuts into premium revenue.[v] But, let us be clear: if FHA's cash reserves are exhausted, the federal government would immediately use taxpayer money to cover the losses, which would be the first time ever of a “bail out” for the FHA insurance program.

FHA moved forward in the last quarter of 2009 with plans to limit risk by bringing on its first Chief Risk Officer, Robert Ryan, and sought to implement certain risk management methodologies, including revisions to seller-financed down payment assistance, through Mortgagee Letters and the Rule Making Process, such as:[vi]

Enacted via Mortgagee Letter, Effective January 1, 2010

  • Require Submission of Audited Financial Statements by Supervised Mortgagees
  • Modify Procedures for Streamline Refinance Transactions
  • Require Appraiser Independence in Loan Origination
  • Modify Appraisal Validity Period
  • Enable Appraisal Portability

Pursued by Rule Making Process

  • Modify Mortgagee Approval and Participation in FHA Loan Origination
  • Increase Net Worth Requirements for Mortgagees

It should be mentioned, importantly, that without the seller-financed down payment assistance loans – which began in 1999 and had grown to over 35% of all FHA-insured home purchase loans by FY 2007 [vii] – the capital reserve ratio for 2009 would have been 2% [viii] -- right at the threshold.

FHA has pointed out that the actuarial review also showed that it has $31 billion in total reserves and, given the increased growth in 2009, that amount represents a 4.5% total reserve ratio on its total insurance‐in‐force, as indicated above. Under FHA’s “Base Case” scenario,[ix] the FHA maintains that it can cover projected claims on outstanding loans, with a $3.6 billion cushion. Nevertheless, the capital reserve ratio, which is the measure of excess reserves beyond the forecasted net claim costs on outstanding loans, is 0.53 percent.

Further impact on the capital reserves caused by other scenarios – such as a “Deeper Recession” than expected, “Up Rate Shock,” “Down Rate Shock,” “Higher Loss Severity,” “Second Severe Recession,” and “Depression” – would obviously lead to further depletion of capital reserves.[x]

Risks and Reforms

I have mentioned, in part, some actions that the FHA has been taking to manage its risk in order to rebalance its insurance program and gradually bring it back to, and perhaps exceed the mandatory 2% threshold. The significant increase in its portfolio virtually demands an immediate and forceful response. Let’s take a brief look at other remedies and reforms.

In response to the portfolio’s growth, FHA is focusing on risk management throughout the agency, not only hiring Robert Ryan, as indicated above, but also by increasing staffing and technical capacity, and implementing new technology systems.[xi]

To handle the threat of subprime lenders to using FHA as its “fall-out” loan type, FHA has steeply increased enforcement, such as its suspension of Taylor, Bean and Whitaker, the recent actions against Lend America, the increased funding for fraud tools, and promulgating policy changes affecting counterparty risk and credit risk management.[xii]

FHA will institute measures to mitigate economic decline beyond the aforementioned “Base Case” scenario, by continuously monitoring of delinquency, default, and economic conditions with improved data‐mining, tightening rules for appraisals, streamline refinances, and lender approvals, reducing cash take‐out allowances on reverse mortgages, and adding FHA‐HAMP to the loss mitigation program to prevent foreclosure.[xiii]

Finally, FHA will respond to borrower payment and default patterns that are significantly different in the current environment from their historic patterns, by monitoring changes in default patterns and net claim costs closely, and being prepared to respond quickly to any significant deviations from forecasts.[xiv]

But will all these remedies be enough to forestall a continuing decline of the capital reserves?

Perfect Storm

FHA insures thirty percent of all home purchase loans today and nearly half of those for first-time homebuyers;[xv] however, there is a rising tide of loans that are in default. About 9.1 percent of FHA borrowers are in default, having missed at least three payments as of December 2009, a statistic that has gone up from 6.5 percent a year ago – which is a 40% increase in this statistic in one year.[xvi] Although the FHA expects the tidal wave of defaults to gradually abate over time, assuming perhaps an “Earlier Recovery” scenario,[xvii] there are signs that the reduction in real estate values may also be contributing to the growing defaults and claims debacle.

New research shows that a borrower starts to consider walking away from the mortgage when the home value falls below 75 percent of the amount owed on the mortgage.[xviii] And, it should be noted, an estimated 4.5 million homeowners had reached this “tipping point” by the third quarter of 2009 [xix] – with projections of 5.1 million homeowners at this 75 percent exiting point by June 2010, equaling approximately 10% of all residential mortgages.[xx]

FHA lenders that originated FHA loans in 2007 and 2008 believe that, although they abided by HUD’s own product and underwriting guidelines at the time, those very same loans have become slow paying technical defaults,[xxi] and eventually are leading to claims against the insurance fund. Generally, it takes a two to three year timeframe after settlement for loans to begin to fail, so the existing onslaught of such loans is obviously being exacerbated by the current financial crisis.

It should come as no surprise, then, that HUD is finding high default rates on lenders that simply originated FHA loans in accordance with HUD’s own guidelines. HUD’s stated policy is to terminate a mortgagee’s FHA approval if a lender has excessive defaults and claims, and is seeking legislative authority to increase enforcement to withdraw both originating and underwriting approval from an FHA lender nationwide on the basis of the performance of its regional branches.[xxii] Indeed, HUD will now “systematically review all Direct Endorsement (DE) underwriting mortgagees’ defaults (loans 90 or more days’ delinquent) and claim rates on loans during the initial 24 months from the date of the commencement of the amortization.” And, at its option, HUD will “exercise its authority to terminate the underwriting authority (Authority) of DE mortgagees with excessive default and claim rates.”[xxiii] How long HUD lets a lender with high defaults go on underwriting loans, without taking such actions, is HUD’s determination to make.

There are unintended consequences caused by these measures taken against a lender with high defaults, because its investors also ascertain the high default rates associated with a specific lender, and, even if HUD has not yet terminated its relationship with the lender, or terminated the lender’s underwriting authority, the investors often preemptively react by withdrawing their funding, which thereby imperils the lender’s ability to originate new loans. The overall effects are to chill the market, reduce competitive pricing, leave otherwise competent and capable lenders with no financing outlets, and ultimately to deprive the consumer of the kind of local, responsible lender that may know them best. Sometimes, in going after the worst practitioners, some of the best ones may be caught in a regulator’s net. Given the financial crisis and its effect on consumer and lender alike, HUD’s daunting task is to be sure that it acts with fairness, resolve, and foresight.

Going After Excessive Default Lenders

The single most important metric to identify poor performance with respect to defaults and claims is the statistic called the Compare Ratio. Derived from the vast data in HUD’s Neighborhood Watch – an “Early Warning System” that is part of HUD’s “Credit Watch/Termination” initiative – this ratio provides a lender’s percentage of originations which are currently in default or were “claim terminated” divided by the percent of originations which are currently in default or were claim terminated for the selected geographic area.[xxiv] The compare ratio is the value that reveals the largest discrepancies between the lender's default and claim percentage and the default and claim percentage to which it is being compared.[xxv] The period bracketed to produce the ratio is the first two years after settlement. A higher ratio is indicative of an area (or lender) that has an unusually high default percentage in comparison with that region or lender's surrounding area. For example, if a lender has an 8% default rate in California and 4% of all California loans defaulted, then the lender's compare ratio equals 200%.[xxvi] The comparative metric uses performance data of various geographic areas, thereby comparing the performance of a particular lender to loan originations by nationwide, Home Ownership Centers (HOC), states, HUD’s Field Offices, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), counties, cities, and zip codes.

A higher ratio indicates an area (or lender) that has an unusually high default percentage in comparison with that region or lender's surrounding area.[xxvii] For quite some time, the originating branch offices of a lender within a HUD Office jurisdiction with a compare ratio exceeding 200% have been at risk of receiving a proposed termination letter from HUD.[xxviii] (To date, the special HOPE for Homeowners Program has not been included in HUD’s performance analysis of a lender’s compare ratio with respect to the CreditWatch/Termination initiative.) [xxix] HUD has continued to make strenuous efforts to address deficiencies in the mortgagee’s performance.[xxx]

On January 9, 2009, Phillip Murray, HUD’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Single Family Housing Programs, said to a meeting of the House Committee on Financial Services, that “FHA currently performs a quarterly analysis of the default and claim rate for each lender branch (approximately 25,000 branches), comparing it with average rates for all lenders located in each HUD field office jurisdiction. Those lenders with a relative compare ratio of greater than 200 percent are subject to proposed termination”[xxxi]

According to FHA Commissioner Steven’s recent announcement, on January 20, 2010, FHA now seeks “maximum flexibility” to establish separate "areas" for purposes of review and termination under the Credit Watch initiative.[xxxii] The expanded authority permits FHA to withdraw originating and underwriting approval for a lender, nationwide, on the basis of the performance of its regional branches. On January 21, 2010 FHA implemented this policy in a Mortgagee Letter, effective on that date. Previously, HUD exercised its authority to terminate only the loan origination approval authority of a mortgagee. Now, HUD will “systematically review all Direct Endorsement (DE) underwriting mortgagees’ defaults (loans 90 or more days’ delinquent) and claim rates on loans during the initial 24 months from the date of the commencement of the amortization. HUD, “at its option, will exercise its authority to terminate the underwriting authority (Authority) of DE mortgagees with excessive default and claim rates.”[xxxiii]

The compare ratio is one of HUD’s most powerful tools to identify the lenders with excessive defaults and claim rates. Every three (3) months, HUD now plans to review the compare ratio of an FHA lender within the geographic area of the lender’s Field Office and, allowing for mitigating factors,[xxxiv] will determine if the lender’s underwriting approval will be terminated on the basis of particularly high rates of defaults and claims. The following table outlines the timeframe and termination thresholds:[xxxv]

24 Month Period Ending Date

Termination Threshold

December 31, 2009

300%

June 30, 2010

250%

December 31, 2010

200%

Underwriting termination may occur if a lender’s compare ratio exceeds both the national rate and 300 percent of the Field Office rate, as of December 31, 2009. Using the same comparative statistics, underwriting termination may occur if a lender’s compare ratio is 250 percent through June 30, 2010, and 200 percent through December 31, 2010. After December 31, 2010, the compare ratio will remain constant at 200 percent of the Field Office default and claim rate.

Using 2009 year end data, approximately 10% of the mortgagees listed in Neighborhood Watch have compare ratios of 200 percent or more.[xxxvi] These lenders will be compared to their Field Office default and claim rate as well, with lenders that exceed the compare ratio threshold now subject to underwriting termination.[xxxvii]

Get Down On It! Reducing Excessive Defaults and Claims

So, what actions can a lender take to bring down the compare ratio, the specific adverse performance experience statistic, before HUD takes administrative action against it? Or, at least, what can be offered to endeavor to dissuade HUD from terminating a lender’s underwriting approval if the compare ratio is too high?[xxxviii]

In response to this crisis of excessive defaults and claims, my firm, Lenders Compliance Group, developed a methodology to reduce the compare ratio gradually over time. We organized our Compare Ratio Task Force® (CRTF) and staffed it in order to work closely with high compare ratio lenders, not only to bring down their defaults and claims rates but also to guide them in implementing ways and means to avoid this problem in the future. The CRTF is a process that stays involved with a lender’s on-going compare ratio performance every single month.

I will provide here an overview of the Compare Ratio Task Force®, in order to demonstrate one viable approach to reducing excessive defaults and claims. We have found that this methodology is effective and it has been designed to comply with the requirements of federal and state banking laws.

Compare Ratio Task Force® (CRTF)

Seven Step Process to Reduce High Compare Ratios

STEP 1: Borrower Eligibility Review. Conduct a comprehensive review of existing defaults and claims for loss mitigation and loan modification eligibility. The lender gives us the list of all loans causing the high compare ratio and we administer a review, using documentation or LOS information. We utilize specially designed checklists and an automated application that looks at a wide variety of data fields, to determine the borrower’s eligibility for loss mitigation or a particular loan modification program.

STEP 2: Notify Lender of Borrower Eligibility. We notify the lender of a borrower’s eligibility for one or more loss mitigation resolutions. Of course, we also indicate which loans are unlikely to be eligible for loss mitigation.

STEP 3: Notify Borrower of Possible Eligibility. Lenders may choose two options at this point: (1) they may send a letter to the borrowers, notifying them about their loss mitigation eligibility, or (2) call the borrower directly to discuss loss mitigation. Some lenders, in fact, prefer to send out to the borrowers a rather generic letter about possible loss mitigation eligibility in an effort to get them to call. Those borrowers who call back the lender, then, go through our Step 1 screening procedures.

STEP 4: Refer Eligible Borrower to Counsel. As a risk management firm, we have access to and use preferred legal counsel to assure nationwide coverage and representation for our clients. But not just any attorney can properly handle loan modification work. Many attorneys have jumped into the loan modification practice in the last two years, but only a few really know what they’re doing. Extensive expertise is needed to achieve an opportunity for a positive outcome. Consequently, we review and approve all outside legal counsel and our own firm’s lawyers determine the selected attorney’s competency to handle loss mitigation and loan modification strategies.

STEP 5: Monitoring the Process. The length of time to effectuate a loan modification pursuant to various loss mitigation guidelines can take three to six months. It is critical that the process be monitored objectively to ensure that the legal work is getting done and the application process is reaching timely completion.

STEP 6: Contact with Servicer. Substantive, time-sensitive reporting requirements are associated with reducing high compare ratios. For example, the servicer reporting when a trial modification has commenced, reporting payments during the trial period, and reporting when the permanent modification has occurred. This data must be entered in a timely manner into HUD’s database in order for the compare ratio statistic to be credible and current. Unless the permanent modification is reported, the compare ratio is not appropriately adjusted in HUD’s Neighborhood Watch.

STEP 7: On-going Review. As old defaults are reduced and the compare ratio gradually declines, new defaults and claims may be added. The two year timeframe continually moves forward, each month, and the compare ratio is recalculated for all defaults and claims that are added or remain. The best time to begin work on an default is as soon as a lender discovers it in Neighborhood Watch. Consequently, the sooner we get involved in implementing the Compare Ratio Task Force® program, the more opportunity there is to make sure the compare ratio is not adversely affected.

“There is an Immeasurable Distance between Late and Too Late”

Og Mandino

HUD will permit loans that closed or were approved before termination to be submitted for insurance endorsement, but cases at earlier stages of processing cannot be submitted for insurance by the terminated mortgagee (though they can be transferred to an approved mortgagee). Loan correspondents with a terminated mortgagee will have only thirty (30) days to establish a new relationship with an approved sponsor and, failing that, will find their own FHA approval terminated. A terminated mortgagee may request to have its authority reinstated no earlier than six (6) months after the effective date of the termination and only after HUD’s Secretary determines that the underlying causes for the termination have been remedied.[xxxix]

The termination of the authority to underwrite FHA-insured single family loans can devastate a lender. Waiting too long to resolve high compare ratios will surely lead to drastic consequences. If a lender has a high compare ratio and takes no action whatsoever to reduce its defaults and claims rate, it has passively placed itself in a position to be terminated. With affirmative and deliberate action, even though the process to reduce the high compare ratio takes place over several months, at least the lender can demonstrate to HUD its commitment to bring down its defaults and claims. Notwithstanding a lender’s high compare ratio, it is at HUD’s option to decide if a lender will be terminated. If a lender does nothing at all to reduce the rate of its defaults and claims, it may leave HUD no option but to terminate it.


[i] Prepared Remarks by David H. Stevens Assistant Secretary for Housing and FHA Commissioner at the Exchequer Club Washington, D.C., Wednesday, January 20, 2010

[ii] “FHA Insurance Fund Has Fallen 39 Percent,” Washington Post, By Dina ElBoghdady, December 3, 2008, sourcing an audit by Integrated Financial Engineering of Rockville, MD; “FHA Reserve Ratio Falls to 0.53%, Lowest in History,” Bloomberg News, By Dawn Kopecki, November 12, 2009

[iii] Based on amortized loan balances, as of September 30, 2009, see FHA Annual Management Report, Fiscal Year 2009, inter alia, p 96, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Available in the Reports section of our website’s Library.

[iv] The findings come as part of FHA’s annual independent actuarial study and reflect FHA’s status at the end of its fiscal year 2009, which concluded in September 2009. Pursuant to the Cranston-Gonzales National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, FHA’s Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund must maintain sufficient capital to sustain a moderate recession – pegged at 2 percent. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) mandated the Secretary to submit an annual independent actuarial study to calculate this ratio.

[v] Op. cit., 2, Bloomberg News

[vi]HUD Secretary, FHA Commissioner, Report on FHA’s Finances,” HUD No. 09-214, November 12, 2009

[vii] FHA Fiscal Year 2009 Actuarial Review Briefing, November 12, 2009, p. 112. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Available in the Reports section of our website’s Library.

[viii] Op. cit., 7, p. 24

[ix] Op. cit., 7, p. 8, “Peak‐to‐trough house price decline of 14% in the Federal Housing Finance Agency index. Includes an 8.6% decline from mid‐2009 to mid‐2010.”

[x] Op. cit., 7, p. 8, p10: “Deeper Recession” is total peak‐to‐trough decline equivalent to a 27% decline in the Case‐Shiller

10‐city index; “Up Rate Shock” is what could happen if capital were to suddenly flow out of mortgage markets; “Down Rate Shock” is what could happen if the economy became stagnant with excess capacity and there were increased capital flows into the mortgage market; “Higher Loss Severity” is a scenario whereby either the expenses of foreclosure and property management are permanently increased, or else REO property values stay low for a long period of time due to oversupply; “Second Severe Recession” is total peak‐to‐trough decline equivalent to about 34% in the Case‐Shiller 10‐city index, with unemployment of 11%, and prepayment rates 10% slower; and “Depression” is total peak‐to‐trough decline equivalent to about 50% decline in the Case‐Shiller 10‐city index, with unemployment of 12.5% and prepayment rates 25% slower.

[xi] Op. cit., 7, p. 28

[xii] Op. cit., 7, p. 29

[xiii] Op. cit., 7, p. 31

[xiv] Op. cit., 7, p. 32

[xv] FY 2011Budget, p. 4, 2/1/10, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

[xvi] “Rising FHA default rate foreshadows a crush of foreclosures,” Washington Post, By Dina ElBoghdady and Dan Keating, February 2, 2010

[xvii] Op. cit., 7, p. 8: “Earlier Recovery” presumes that the national housing market is now finding its trough, and that there will be no further home price declines in 2010.

[xviii] "No Help in Sight, More Homeowners Walk Away," by David Streitfeld, New York Times, February 2, 2010

[xix] Ibid.

[xx] Statistics on this trend can be found in the The Negative Equity Report, 11/24/09, First American CoreLogic

[xxi] HUD defines a defaulted loan as one which evidences the inability to make timely monthly mortgage payments or otherwise comply with mortgage terms. A loan is considered in default when payment has not been paid after 60 to 90 days. The period used is the first 24 months after endorsement.

[xxii] "FHA Announces Policy Changes to Address Risk and Strengthen Finances," HUD No. 10-016, January 20, 2010

[xxiii] “Mortgagee Approval for Single Family Programs – Extended Procedures for Terminating Underwriting Authority,” Mortgagee Letter 2010-03, January 21, 2010

[xxiv] Data can be analyzed by three general categories: lender, location, and product type. The public can access the compare ratio and other data by visiting HUD’s Neighborhood Watch at https://entp.hud.gov/sfnw/public/

[xxv] Neighborhood Watch / Early Warning System - Definitions and Explanations

[xxvi] Ibid., FAQs

[xxvii] “Neighborhood Watch provides loan performance data via the FHA Connection HUD,” Mortgagee Letter 00-20, June 2, 2000, FAQs, p. 2

[xxviii] “Mortgagee Approval for Single Family Programs - Elimination of Placement on Credit Watch Status - Superseding the references to Credit Watch in Mortgagee Letter 99-15,” Mortgagee Letter 99-15, October 12, 2001

[xxix] “HOPE for Homeowners Program – Comprehensive Guidance,” Mortgagee Letter 09-23, October 20, 2009

[xxx] For example, as provided in the HUD mortgagee approval regulations at 24 CFR 202.3. And, proposed rule revisions on April 1, 2003, at 68 CFR 15906, published as an interim rule on December 17, 2004, effective January 18, 2005; and the final rule that took effect on March 1, 2006.

[xxxi] “FHA Oversight of Loan Originators,” Prepared Statement of Phillip Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Single Family Housing Programs, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Meeting of the Committee on Financial Services

United States House of Representatives, January 9, 2009, p. 4

[xxxii] Op. cit., 22

[xxxiii] “Mortgagee Approval for Single Family Programs – Extended Procedures for Terminating Underwriting Authority,” Mortgagee Letter 10-03, January 21, 2010

[xxxiv] Such as analyses of loans in terms of underserved versus served census tracts, compared to the performance in the Field Office average for similar loans.

[xxxv] Op. cit., 33, p. 2

[xxxvi] As of 12/31/09, there were approximate 3000 FHA mortgagees listed and given compare ratios in Neighborhood Watch, of which approximately 308 have compare ratios of 200 percent or more on a nationwide basis.

[xxxvii] The recent probe into the excessive claims rates of 15 mortgagees seems to be just the tip of the iceberg, given the considerable percentage of mortgagees with defaults and claims, as reflected in their high compare ratios. See: "HUD Inspector General Probes Mortgage Companies with Significant Claim Rates," HUD. No. 10-005, January 12, 2010

[xxxviii] There is an Appeal Process, which permits a mortgagee to request an informal conference within 30 calendar days of the date of receipt of the proposed termination notice.

[xxxix] Op. cit., 33, pp 3-4. To remedy, the lender must obtain an independent review, conducted by a CPA, of the terminated areas operation -- identifying the underlying cause for the mortgagee’s high default and claim rate. The mortgagee must also submit a written corrective action plan to address each of the issues identified in the CPA’s report, along with evidence that the plan has been implemented. HUD may also impose additional requirements for reinstatement.