Mortgage Fraud Challenges: How to Catch a Crook

Jonathan Foxx

Chairman & Managing Director

Two of our Directors will be attending the MBA’s “Risk Management, QA & Fraud Prevention Forum,” held in Los Angeles, in September. Attending this venue will be Brandy George, who is the Executive Director of LCG Quality Control and Michael Pfeifer, who is a Director of Legal and Regulatory Compliance. I remember attending the first forum many years ago. The attendance was modest. Although risk management was strengthening, I felt the term risk management was much too broad, as it could be (and was) applied to many industries. So, I coined the term “Mortgage Risk Management” and it caught on! My view has been that mortgage banking poses a unique set of risks that require significant knowledge, experience, and expertise. Turns out, this insight has been reinforced over the years. Now, this event is highly attended and is brimming with new ways to handle quality assurance, mortgage fraud prevention, and risk management oversight.

As I contemplated this forthcoming conference, I thought of the difficulties that mortgage originators have in handling the challenges of mortgage fraud in particular. This is a nasty business and not for the faint hearted! When my firm conducts audits of the loan flow process, it is not unusual to find gaps – perhaps ‘chasms’ is a better word! – in a company’s procedures for managing mortgage fraud risk. It still surprises me, after so many decades in mortgage banking compliance and financial institution management, that the fraudsters seem to have no limit to their scheming, conniving, crafty, wily, and underhanded cunning. These guys are as slippery as a darkly oleaginous grease slick.

Maybe I can’t stop these swindlers and shysters from doing what they do, but I can let you know some of the lessons my firm, Lenders Compliance Group®, has learned in knowing how to identify and trap them. I may not have all the answers, but I sure do have a lot of experience in hooking the crook. So, come with me on a brief walk through the mortgage fraud maze, as I jot down some of my reflections, and perhaps you should consider using some of my ideas to fine-tune your own mortgage fraud prevention procedures.

Let’s start with a simple outline of what fraudsters do!

Committing Fraud

During the mortgage lending process, a fraudster is a person who knowingly does any of the following:

• Makes, uses, or facilitates any deliberate misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission with the intention that it be relied upon by a mortgage lender, borrower, or any other party to the mortgage lending process;
• Receives any proceeds or any other funds in connection with a closing involving mortgage fraud; or
• Files or causes to be filed with the county recorder, any document that contains a deliberate misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission.

In my view, there are two types of mortgage fraud: the first is fraud for property, and the second is fraud for profit.

Mortgage Crisis Commission: Tragedy or Farce?

Here we go again! A commission. The politician's way of seeming to do something, though really doing nothing, all the while defusing criticism and dispersing risk. *

Three years late and stunted politically at its very inception, this year's version of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission will likely do little to uncover any truths which we don't already know and reconcile nothing that would not have been reconciled in any event without a commission.

Let's take a close look at the new special investigations unit, already being dubbed the Mortgage Crisis Commission.   

• Marching Orders
• The Players
• Chairman
• Chairmen
• Predators and Prey
• Gambit
• Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

Marching Orders

The following 'marching orders' are from President Obama's State of the Union Address 2012, given on January 24, 2012:

"And if you're a mortgage lender or a payday lender or a credit card company, the days of signing people up for products they can't afford with confusing forms and deceptive practices are over."

"And tonight, I am asking my Attorney General to create a special unit of federal prosecutors and leading state attorneys general to expand our investigations into the abusive lending and packaging of risky mortgages that led to the housing crisis. This new unit will hold accountable those who broke the law, speed assistance to homeowners, and help turn the page on an era of recklessness that hurt so many Americans."

The Players

The "special unit" mentioned by the President is an office of Mortgage Origination and Securitization Abuses. Special units don't have Chairpersons, but this one does. So, let's just stick to the word "commission" for the time being. Its chairman is to be Eric Schneiderman, the Attorney General of New York. This investigation unit is to be part of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.

In addition to Eric Schneiderman, the commission will be co-chaired by Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney General at the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; Robert Khuzami, the SEC's Director of Enforcement; John Walsh, the U. S. Attorney in Colorado; and Tony West, the Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ's Civil Division.

According to the White House, "the goal of this joint investigation will be threefold: to hold accountable any institutions that violated the law; to compensate victims and help provide relief for homeowners struggling from the collapse of the housing market, caused in part by this wrongdoing; and to help us finally turn the page on this destructive period in our nation's history."

Chairman

Eric Schneiderman has been developing a reputation as a fighter against tax cheaters. More to the point, he has been opposing a bank foreclosure deal - which has been strongly backed by the Obama Administration - arguing that the settlement would place a limit on investigating wrongdoing on the part of banks. He has come under intense pressure from the Administration and its functionaries, such as Shawn Donovan of HUD, and many Attorneys General, to support the settlement. In fact, Mr. Schneiderman was kicked off the AGs' negotiating committee. The big stumbling block in the settlement has been that, in exchange for the banks' agreeing to a settlement, the Attorneys General who are participating in the settlement would have to agree to sign broad releases preventing them from bringing further litigation on matters relating to improper bank practices. The price tag was $20 billion.

Interestingly, quite recently there has been news about a potential settlement after all. Under this proposed settlement, banks would agree to follow existing laws against abusive foreclosures and set aside $25 billion to help homeowners who are underwater on their homes or who were wrongfully foreclosed. We still need to learn the full details regarding the level of legal immunity granted to banks accused of wrongdoing as well as the scope of violations covered by the settlement.

The cynical amongst us might think that AG Schneiderman has held out long enough against mighty Administration pressure and has been offered now some national prominence by being named the Chairman of this commission. After all, Mr. Schneiderman sat near First Lady Michelle Obama at the State of the Union speech and he issued the following statement: "I would like to thank President Obama for his leadership in the creation of a coordinated investigation that marshals state and federal resources to bring justice for the victims of the misconduct that caused the mortgage crisis."

FinCEN: Fraud and Mortgage Rescue Schemes

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has just released its 20th issue of the SAR Activity Review - Trends, Tips, and Issues. The publication provides information about SARs and Remote Deposit Capture risks, Organized Retail Crime, Health Care Fraud, Elder Financial Exploitation, and more.

Of particular interest is a section devoted to the U.S. Trustee Program's (USTP) civil enforcement activity targeting bankruptcy-related mortgage fraud and mortgage rescue schemes. The USTP is a unit in the Department of Justice (DOJ) responsible for overseeing the administration of bankruptcy cases and private trustees. In that capacity, it also identifies and helps investigate bankruptcy fraud and abuse in coordination with United States Attorneys, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other law enforcement agencies.

In this SAR Activity Review, USTP provides information regarding its role in combating these schemes, and, importantly, provides tips to financial institutions on detecting such unlawful activity.

The following outline provides:

• A Brief statement
• Financial Consultant Schemes (Red Flags)
• Sale-Lease Back and Property Transfer Schemes (Red Flags)
• Reverse Mortgage Schemes
• Library – Download Issuance

A Brief Statement

Bankruptcy-related mortgage fraud and mortgage rescue schemes use know how to exploit the federal bankruptcy court system.

Perpetrators of mortgage foreclosure rescue fraud schemes use these courts as a means to defraud vulnerable consumers in jeopardy of losing their homes to foreclosure or eviction.

Here's a strategy used by perpetrators:

1) The filing of a bankruptcy case triggers an automatic stay.
2) This filing then immediately stops all collections actions.

Point 1: Perpetrators often take advantage of the automatic stay, using it to give consumers the impression that the perpetrators' false promises of saving their homes are true since collection activities cease - at least temporarily.

Point 2: In some of these schemes, perpetrators use the courts by recommending to consumers that they file bankruptcy to eliminate their unsecured debt and thereby position themselves to buy back their houses as part of a sale-lease back scheme.

Point 3: Sometimes the perpetrators themselves file bankruptcy to discharge the debt they incurred as part of their mortgage fraud schemes. 

Financial Consultant Schemes

• This is the most common mortgage rescue frauds encountered in bankruptcy. In this scenario, the perpetrators falsely tell desperate homeowners that, for a fee, they can help the homeowners save their homes by working with their lenders to stop foreclosure and modify or refinance their loans. Perpetrators identify homeowners through advertising on TV, on radio, in local newspapers, or on the Internet; through connections with churches and other affinity-based ethnic groups; or through foreclosure lists available from local governmental agencies. Homeowners are told to make their mortgage payments to the perpetrators or are required to pay the perpetrators a monthly consulting fee, or both. Of course, the perpetrators do not contact the lenders. Instead, they file serial fraudulent bankruptcy cases in the homeowners' names, sometimes without the homeowners' knowledge or consent, to use the automatic stay to stop the foreclosure.
• Here's a variation: homeowners are directed by the perpetrators to quitclaim fractional interests in their homes to fictitious individuals or businesses. Bankruptcy cases are then filed serially in the names of the fictitious individuals or businesses to continue the operation of the automatic stay. A third variation involves the perpetrators transferring fractional interests to unsuspecting individual debtors with pending bankruptcy cases without their knowledge or consent. Under any of these scenarios, because collection activity has been suspended, homeowners mistakenly believe that the perpetrators have fulfilled their false promises, and the homeowners' continue to pay the perpetrators.

Red Flags

Mortgage payments stop being made.

Mortgage payments abruptly stop with no contact from the homeowner and/or default occurs on the mortgage within a month or two after the loan is made.

The foreclosure process is stayed by a bankruptcy filing.

The filing of the bankruptcy case may be in tandem with the sudden failure to make regular mortgage payments.

The debtor in the bankruptcy case that stayed the foreclosure is not the borrower.

The debtor does not disclose a fractional interest and/or other ownership in real property in his/her bankruptcy documents.

Failure to disclose such interests may indicate a fractional interest or property transfer scheme.

Serial bankruptcy cases are filed and/or numerous lenders file motions seeking relief from the automatic stay to proceed with foreclosure and/or eviction actions.

Where the perpetrators file serial bankruptcy cases, especially those involving fractional interest schemes, financial institutions should expect to see other lenders filing motions seeking relief from the bankruptcy automatic stay as well.

Sale-Lease Back and Property Transfer Schemes

• In this scheme, the perpetrator gains control of an individual's home and skims real or manufactured equity from the property. The perpetrator tells the homeowner that the home can be saved by selling it to a third-party purchaser chosen by the perpetrator - also known as a "straw purchaser" - and then renting it back from the purchaser for an amount less than the homeowner's current mortgage payment. Frequently the perpetrator promises that the homeowner can buy the home back within a certain period of time at the same price at which it was sold, thus protecting the homeowner's "equity." (In some schemes, the perpetrator persuades the homeowner to file bankruptcy in order to repair the homeowner's credit and place the homeowner in a better position to obtain financing to buy back the home.)
• The perpetrators of these schemes profit by gaining control of the properties and obtaining fraudulent loans in the straw purchasers' names based on inflated appraisals of the properties' value. The inflated sales price creates a significant amount of "fake" equity that the perpetrators take through fees that are included in the closing payoffs. Moreover, the perpetrators may arrange to have any remaining sales proceeds signed over to them, rather than to the homeowners. The straw purchasers usually receive some money at closing for each property purchased. Eventually the straw purchasers file bankruptcy to discharge the mortgage debt incurred in their names. Usually, they do not disclose payments received at closing in their bankruptcy documents. In the end, the homeowners lose their homes.
• A version of this scheme involves renters. Homeowners desperate to sell their homes are persuaded to "sell" their property to the perpetrators based on false promises that the perpetrators will obtain new loans to pay off the homeowners' existing mortgages. The perpetrators do not get financing, but instead put renters in the properties and collect the rents. No mortgage payments are made and the financial institutions are not notified of the title transfer. To further the scheme, the perpetrators may file incomplete serial bankruptcy cases in the homeowners' and/or renters' names without their knowledge or consent for purposes of obtaining the automatic stay to stop the collection actions.
  

Wells Fargo's "Seventeen Worthless Mortgages"

COMMENTARY: by JONATHAN FOXX

Jonathan Foxx is a former Chief Compliance Officer of two publicly traded financial institutions, and the President and Managing Director of Lenders Compliance Group, the nation’s first full-service, mortgage risk management firm in the country.

On March 1, 2011, the US Court of Appeals (Fourth Circuit) filed a Per Curiam opinion. In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Old Republic Title Insurance Company, Wells Fargo sought to recover the value of "seventeen worthless mortgages" - the Court's own words! - it purchased from Financial Mortgage, Inc. (FMI), a mortgage banker, in the secondary mortgage market. The scheme involved Title Pro, an agent of Old Republic, colluding with FMI to fraudulently close the real estate transactions underlying Wells Fargo's mortgages. Wells Fargo claimed that Old Republic was contractually bound to indemnify Wells Fargo for its losses. 

The Court ruled in favor of Old Republic! Let's learn why.

Commentary and Outline

This Commentary offers a brief outline. I am leaving out citations, where possible, for ease of reading. This outline is not meant to be comprehensive, authoritative, or relied upon for legal advice. It offers only a brief synopsis of the argumentation. For citations, exhibits, and argumentation, read the judicial decision (below).

The Scheme

FMI originated mortgages and drew on its warehouse lines from several financial institutions. After the warehouse lenders advanced funds to FMI for a mortgage loan, FMI would then sell the mortgage to secondary investors, use the proceeds to pay back the warehouse lenders, and thereby replenish its lines of credit.

So far, so good.

But this is where the plot thickens.

Beginning May 2004, Wells Fargo entered into a standard Loan Purchase Agreement with FMI. This Agreement set forth the terms required by Well Fargo to purchase from FMI numerous residential mortgage loans secured by a note and deed of trust on real property, properly recorded and free from prior liens.

However, the very mortgages purchased by Wells Fargo from FMI failed at their inception, because FMI misrepresented to Wells Fargo that the mortgages were recorded in Virginia's public records system, providing Wells Fargo with first and exclusive priority over all other creditors. Eventually, Wells Fargo discovered that it actually had unsecured and/or subordinate positions on these loans, because they were not recorded nor free from the prior liens.

An Agency Agreement       

Old Republic, like most title insurance companies, appoints agents to act on its behalf to sign, countersign and issue commitments, binders, title reports, certificates, guarantees, title insurance policies, endorsements, and other agreements under which the insurer assumes liability for the condition of title.

In Old Republic's Agency Agreement with TitlePro, the latter was expressly prohibited from acting as an agent of Old Republic when, on some occasions, TitlePro might serve as a settlement agent. That is, when TitlePro performed such services, the Agency Agreement expressly prohibits TitlePro from acting as an agent of Old Republic.

FMI and TitlePro - Two Ways to Collude

Version One (Variations on a Theme) - 3 Bogus Mortgages

1) FMI secures a buyer of land or a refinancing opportunity.
2) FMI then sends the necessary mortgage documents to TitlePro.
2) TitlePro then uses the loan documents to create the appearance of loan closings (i.e., completing a HUD-1 Settlement Statement, et cetera).
3) TitlePro is now able to obtain funds from FMI's warehouse lenders (which does not include Wells Fargo).
4) After obtaining the funds, TitlePro fails to use those funds to clear title or pay off the pre-existing mortgage.
5) TitlePro transfers the funds to FMI.
6) For many transactions, FMI also creates multiple, unrecorded "first" mortgages on each property by having borrowers sign multiple sets of "original" loan documents at closing. (I'll call these "first" mortgages "bogus mortgages.")
7) FMI fabricates the notes.
8) FMI sells these unrecorded bogus mortgages to several secondary investors, including Wells Fargo.
9) In each of these transactions, FMI fails: (a) to disclose the existence of the other bogus mortgages with prior liens to purchasers of these mortgages and (b) to record the mortgages it subsequently sold.
10) Wells Fargo deals with FMI exclusively, sending payment for the notes directly to FMI's accounts.
11) Wells Fargo does not interact with TitlePro or Old Republic in any way.

Version Two - 14 Bogus Mortgages

1) TitlePro fills out a HUD-1 Settlement Statement and receives loan proceeds from the warehouse lender.   
2) The HUD-1 Settlement Statements requires TitlePro to use these funds to pay off the prior mortgages on the properties.
3) TitlePro fails to pay off the prior mortgages and release them of record.
4) TitlePro also fails to record the new mortgage in favor of FMI that "secured" the notes eventually sold to Wells Fargo.
5) In each of these transactions, FMI fails: (a) to disclose the existence of the other bogus mortgages with prior liens to purchasers of these mortgages and (b) to record the mortgages it subsequently sold.
6) Old Republic does not issue policies on these transactions, because Old Republic's Commitment letters requires the prior mortgages to be "paid and released of record" as a condition of issuing the title insurance policies.
7) For some of these transactions, Old Republic also issues a standard-form closing protection letter (CPL), agreeing to reimburse FMI for losses arising out of an issuing agent's misconduct in closing a transaction.

Scammed!

Wells Fargo now possesses seventeen worthless mortgages, all of which are presently in default.

District Court

When Wells Fargo began this action back in March 2009, it alleged six claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) a business conspiracy in violation of Virginia Code; (3) common law civil conspiracy; (4) fraud; (5) violations of Virginia's Wet Settlement Act, and (6) negligence. For all but the breach of contract claims, Wells Fargo alleged that TitlePro acted as Old Republic's agent when it closed the disputed transactions.

The District Court granted summary judgment to Old Republic because:

1) It rejected Wells Fargo's contention that Virginia's Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (CRESPA) made Old Republic liable, reasoning that CRESPA does no more than authorize non-attorneys, including title agents, who meet specific statutory conditions to serve as settlement agents.

2) It held that TitlePro did not have actual agency authority because the Agency Agreement explicitly prohibited TitlePro from acting as a settlement agent on Old Republic's behalf.

3) In accordance with Virginia law, it rejected Wells Fargo's theory of apparent authority, reasoning that Wells Fargo did not reasonably rely on Old Republic's conduct or statements allegedly cloaking TitlePro with apparent authority to act as a settlement agent on Old Republic's behalf.   

For these reasons, the District Court also granted summary judgment to Old Republic on the conspiracy, Wet Settlement Act, and fraud claims.

Plus:

4) The District Court rejected the breach of contract claim, reasoning that Old Republic could assert the same defenses against Wells Fargo as it could against the assignor of the contract, FMI, and one such defense -- fraud -- shielded it from contractual liability. (The District Court also ruled that the negligence claim failed because, in negligence claims, the common law duty protecting person or property does not extend to Wells Fargo's acquisition of worthless notes. Wells Fargo did not challenge this holding on appeal.)

Appeals Court

Wells Fargo appealed, arguing that:

(1) an assertedly "ambiguous" agency agreement and Old Republic's course of conduct raise genuine issues of material fact as to the scope of TitlePro's agency;

(2) the District Court misinterpreted CRESPA;

(3) TitlePro furthered the conspiracy by issuing title insurance instruments, as authorized by Old Republic, thus making the latter liable in conspiracy; and,

(4) a provision in Old Republic's title insurance policy absolved Wells Fargo (an innocent purchaser for value) of any fraud-based defenses Old Republic may have against FMI.

Yet the Appeals Court upheld the District Court's ruling. Why?

Back to that Agency Agreement

So, why did the Appeals Court affirm the District Court?

Because there are two provisions of the Agency Agreement, though seeming to conflict with each other, which rather serve separate, but complementary ends.

On one hand, a section requires TitlePro to record documents "necessary to insure the interest," not every document necessary to close the transaction. The primary purpose of this settlement-like duty is to "minimize the risk of loss under the title insurance policies," not create a general agency relationship capturing all the agent's settlement activities.

On the other hand, in another section, Old Republic unequivocally withholds consent for TitlePro to act as an agent when TitlePro performs "any escrow, closing or settlement" services. Courts throughout the country, including those interpreting Virginia law, agree that such an express limitation on agency duties controls.

Accordingly, Wells Fargo ran out of luck and Old Republic was off the hook.

Justice Served?

On November 13, 2008, the owner of FMI, Vijay Taneja, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of federal law and received a sentence of 84 months imprisonment, to be followed by three-years of supervised release.

But what about that little matter of those "seventeen worthless mortgages?"

Click for the Per Curiam Opinion.

What do you think?

I would welcome your comments.

Please feel free to email me at any time.