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Showing posts with label Consumer Financial Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Consumer Financial Law. Show all posts

Monday, January 30, 2017

Production Incentives: Protecting the Consumer, plus Compliance Checklist for Production Incentives

Jonathan Foxx
Managing Director

Production incentives have been around since the dawn of modern capitalism. They are not going anywhere. Incentives have been called sales incentives, sales bonuses, compensation bonuses, and take into account any additional remuneration that tends to be transactionally based. All such incentives can be grouped into business objectives where a transaction may be tied to certain benchmarks, met by employees or service providers, the achievement of which leads to an increase in wage or reward for the party achieving the stated goal. For the sake of discussion, let’s call forms of such economic inducement, collectively, as “incentives.”

Typical incentives include cross-selling, where sales or referrals of new products or services are pitched to existing consumers; sales of products or services to new customers; sales at higher prices where pricing discretion exists; quotas for customer calls completed; and collections benchmarks.

Some of these incentives are very complex in the way they are achieved and applied, whether optionally or required. The incentive challenge is one of the usual conundrums arising when money and capital formation meet: the opportunity for harm to the consumer. Obviously, incentives offer a way to further enhance revenue for the seller of services and products. Indeed, in our market economy, an incentive can reveal the economic interest of market participants in a particular service or product, which is extrapolated from consumers’ responses to the offerings. Like so much in finance, incentives are not inherently good or bad, but how they are applied makes them so!

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“Bureau”) has decided to weigh in with guidance on production incentives. I am going to provide my reading of the Bureau’s most recent bulletin on this topic, entitled “Detecting and Preventing Consumer Harm from Production Incentives” (Bulletin 2016-03, November 28, 2016, hereinafter “Bulletin”). It is an interesting read, because it endeavors not only to compile guidance that the Bureau had provided in other contexts but also draws on the Bureau’s supervisory and enforcement experience in which incentives contributed to substantial consumer harm. Importantly, the Bulletin offers some actions that supervised entities should take to mitigate risks posed by incentives.

This White Paper article is an adjunct to an earlier published web article (December 2016), with further elaboration herein, plus now including a "Compliance Checklist for Production Incentives," which provides some helpful guidelines to creating production incentive plans. The full White Paper, Article, and Compliance Checklist may be downloaded from our firm's website at LendersComplianceGroup.com. 

RISKS

The most obvious risk of incentives to the consumer is a sales program that includes an enhanced economic motivation for employees or service providers to pursue overly aggressive marketing, sales, servicing, or collections tactics. These kinds of incentives are and always have been features of sales tactics that do not meet regulatory scrutiny. Consequently, it is the case that the Bureau has taken enforcement action against financial institutions that have expected or required employees to open accounts or enroll consumers in services without consent or where employees or service providers have misled consumers into purchasing products the consumers did not want, were unaware would harm them financially, or came with an unexpected ongoing periodic fee.

One or more regulatory violations may be triggered as a result of such incentives. To name but a few of the more salient regulatory frameworks that can be violated, impermissible incentives can cause violations of unfair, deceptive, and/or abusive acts or practices (UDAAP) (Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 1031 & 1036(a), codified at 12 USC §§ 5531 & 5536(a), the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), as implemented by Regulation E (15 USC § 1693 et seq.; 12 CFR Part 1005); the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as implemented by Regulation V (15 USC § 1681-1681x; 12 CFR Part 1022); the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), as implemented by Regulation Z (15 USC § 1601 et seq.; 12 CFR Part 1026); and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 USC § 1692-1692p). And to this the Bureau itself notes that violations can stir up public enforcement, supervisory actions, private litigation, reputational harm, and potential alienation of existing and future customers.

Although not meant to be comprehensive, here are some impermissible incentives that surely trigger regulatory violations:
  • Opening Accounts: sales goals that encourage employees, either directly or indirectly, to open accounts or enroll consumers in services without their knowledge or consent, which may result in improperly incurred fees, improper collections activities, and/or negative effects on consumer credit scores;
  • Benchmarks: sales benchmarks that encourage employees or service providers to market a product deceptively to consumers who may not benefit from or even qualify for it;
  • Terms or Conditions: paying compensation based on the terms or conditions of transactions (such as interest rate) that encourages employees or service providers to overcharge consumers, to place them in less favorable products than they qualify for, or to sell them more credit or services than they had requested or needed;
  • Tiered Compensation: paying more compensation for some types of transactions than for others that were or could have been offered to meet consumer needs, which could lead employees or service providers to steer consumers to transactions not in their interests; and 
  • Quotas: unrealistic quotas to sign consumers up for financial services may incentivize employees to achieve this result without actual consent or by means of deception.

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

Steering Consumers to Expensive Mortgage Loans

The CFPB announced that it had filed a complaint yesterday in a federal district court against Utah-based Castle & Cooke Mortgage, LLC (“C & C”) and two of its officers for illegally giving bonuses to loan officers who steered consumers into mortgages with higher interest rates.

C & C is not some mom and pop mortgage company: in 2012 it originated in the range of $1.3 billion, and it does business in at least 22 states, and maintains approximately 45 branches across the country.

At the core of the complaint is the allegation that C & C violated the Loan Originator Compensation Rule (“LOC Rule”) which bans compensation based on loan terms, such as the interest rate of the loan. Specifically, the CFPB alleges that C & C violated the LOC Rule by establishing a quarterly bonus program, which paid certain C & C loan officers greater bonus compensation when they persuaded consumers to take on more expensive loans. The average quarterly bonus ranged from $6,100 to $8,700.

The CFPB further alleges, that, by contrast, those loan officers who did not charge consumers higher interest rates did not receive quarterly bonuses. (The CFPB also alleges that C & C did not record what portion of each loan officer’s quarterly bonus was attributable to a particular loan and did not reference its quarterly bonus program in each loan originator’s compensation agreement, in violation of federal consumer financial law.)

The idiomatic expression for this is called "selling up" or "upselling the consumer" or "up-charging the borrower." So, briefly put, the CFPB alleges that more than 1,100 illegal quarterly bonuses were paid - where the loan officers had been given the forgoing incentive - and that tens of thousands of customers may have been upsold by C & C since April 6, 2011, the compliance effective date of the LOC Rule.

The time frame is important. It is alleged that from July 8, 2011 through April 27, 2012 the company paid to its loan officers more than 500 quarterly bonuses, in amounts that varied based on loan terms or conditions, totaling more than $4 million. And is it further alleged that since May 2012, C & C had actually continued paying quarterly bonuses to loan officers in amounts that varied based on loan terms or conditions, and, thus by doing so from the compliance effective date, according to the CFPB, the company “recklessly or knowingly paid quarterly bonuses based on loan terms or conditions, in violation of the Compensation Rule.” The “recklessly and knowingly” allegation is made in order to set the bar for civil monetary penalties at the highest levels.

Bottom Line: The CFPB's position is that, by tying bonuses to the interest rate of the loans in this manner, C & C was in direct violation of the LOC Rule.

Another interesting facet of this complaint is that the case was referred to the CFPB by investigators with the Utah Department of Commerce, Division of Real Estate (jointly, “CFPB”). This should further reinforce the fact and make exceedingly clear that states and the CFPB are more and more working together seamlessly to enforce the applicable regulations. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, where the company is located and where the individual defendants reside.

Both the state regulator and the CFPB are claiming that C & C violated the LOC Rule by paying its loan officers quarterly bonuses in amounts based on terms or conditions of the loans they closed, thus "incentivizing loan officers to steer consumers into mortgages with less favorable terms," which, of course, is the very practice the LOC Rule seeks to prevent.

The remedies being sought would require C & C to desist from providing an incentive to loan officers to up-charge consumers by distributing quarterly bonuses based on the interest rates of loans sold. In addition to the restitution to consumers, the CFPB seeks civil monetary penalties, which is three tiered: up to $5,000 for any violation; up to $25,000 for reckless violations; and up to $1,000,000 for knowing violations.

I have read the full complaint. Permit me to outline the "before and after" process that the CFPB alleges C & C used, which forms the basis of the CFPB's complaint:

Before the LOC Rule compliance effective date, it is alleged:

1) Each branch of C & C employed loan officers who interacted directly with borrowers. C & C paid its loan officers to assist borrowers with obtaining credit to be secured by a dwelling.

2) A loan officer took an initial loan application, assessed the borrower’s creditworthiness, and determined the interest rates available to the borrower for a given loan product.

3) Borrowers did not directly compensate C & C's loan officers for the loan origination services they provided.

4) C & C paid its loan officers commissions based on the interest rates of the loans they offered to consumers, that is, the higher the interest rates, the higher the loan officers’ commissions.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Waiting for the CFPB

My sources tell me that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) will soon announce substantial monetary penalties and other administrative actions against a large nonbank. I guess it is inevitable that when such an announcement is finally out and about, humans  - and especially the financial services type humans - will be easily aroused to panic - which means the nascent, CFPB exam preparation industry will receive a steroidal boost. And the frisson of dismay and frenzy will be stirred up even further by the ambulance chasers, running to the rescue, with their merry band of products and services to quell the indomitable, bureaucratic brute.
There are plenty of compliance and law firms scouring the horizon for new clients that seek CFPB exam readiness. Indeed, I know of one such firm that has made fear-mongering into a fine art, whirring about and speaking at industry events where a surfeit of anxiety and angst may be supremely generated. As the affrighted crowd bounds into the arms of these ushers of deliverance, seeking the aegis of their singular protection, they are quite sold on a full scale risk assessment and sempiternal, on-going monitoring. But the prospective clients, sore at the loss of money in this endeavor, need not be too vexed, inasmuch as they do get action plans, some risk assessment tools, and assorted bric-a-brac of one-size-fits-all templates "specially drafted" for their own unique purposes.
Our industry is a strong bunch, survivors of the toughest real estate cycles, and accustomed to adapting to regulatory mandates. We have seen the largest fall and the lowest rise. We push back, when needed; and we push forward, when appropriate. We know that our industry is the backbone of the economy. Our future will not be compromised by cold sweat and consternation.
So, when considering the legal and regulatory compliance requirements of the CFPB, how alarmed and apprehensive should we be?
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Trembling before the Tsar
In the Tsardom of Russia, most people never met the Tsar. They met his agents, which at the time meant the duly constituted orders of functionaries who acted in accordance with the law. The people who did meet the Tsar, even nobles, were known (and even expected) to tremble in his presence. Like the custom required by English kings, the people who stood in the presence of the Tsar stated their views, when called upon to speak, and, upon finishing their statements, they left the reception chamber by bowing and slowly backing out of the room, always facing the Tsar. This kind of obeisance showed respect for the established order and reflected the insuperable power and primacy of the monarchy.
But we do not live in a monarchy and the CFPB is not the Tsar.
We need not tremble before the CFPB!
There are a set of guidelines that the CFPB requires for implementation by lenders, mortgage brokers, servicers, and others in the financial services sector. Most of these guidelines are not particularly ponderous, unless the foregoing entities hadn't been implementing them all along. It is not as if we do not know the importance of fair lending or proper data collection pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). There is no real mystery regarding compliance with advertising rules. Every company is keenly aware of the mandates set forth in the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).
At this point in the industry's growth, who does not know about the importance of risk controls and risk mitigation? Who does not know about the central importance of responsible and knowledgeable management? How many companies willfully ignore consumer complaints?
A whole generation of bankers, lenders, brokers, and servicers have cultivated a heightened sensitivity to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and Fair & Accurate Credit Transaction Act (FACTA), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering Program requirements, Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), Home Ownership & Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), Secure & Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act (SAFE Act), the Fair Housing Act, the Anti-Predatory Lending Act, the National Do-Not-Call Registry, and monitoring third party service providers (sometimes neutrally referred to as "vendor management").
These are the sorts of areas about which the CFPB has an interest in ensuring consumer financial protection. None of the aforementioned is strange or new to anybody who has been paying attention!
I have said many times that 'Preparation is Protection' - and most companies associated with residential mortgage loan originations and servicing have been preparing, thus protecting themselves, for a long, long time. Many have been through numerous state and federal banking examinations, responding, where needed, with corrective actions. Not a few have retained competent mortgage risk management firms or in-house compliance advisors. Even those who cannot afford compliance counsel have participated in one way or another in conferences, conventions, and training venues in order to be educated in regulatory developments. Everybody now knows unequivocally that sales are cemented to compliance.
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Who's afraid of the big bad wolf?
As I wrote recently, the CFPB has considerable enforcement powers. Among other things, it can rescind or reform contracts, require the refunding of money to a consumer and demand other forms of restitution, mandate the disgorgement and refunding of various types of assets, compel the return of real property, cause fees and other compensation to be disgorged for unjust enrichment, require the payment of damages or other monetary relief, cause public notification regarding a violation, limit the activities or functions of alleged violators, and, of course, exact civil monetary penalties.
But, in terms of the remedies mentioned above, none of these administrative actions is really new. Virtually every state banking department in the country has most of these enforcement powers. Nearly all prudential regulators have many such authorities. Banks and nonbanks that have undergone routine examinations are not an unsuspecting lot, completely unprepared for the kinds of detailed review that the CFPB conducts. Having watched the CFPB in action, I can say that a firm that is adequately prepared for a state or federal examination should be prepared for a CFPB examination.
Is the CFPB's examination a bit more detailed? Yes. But most of the exam requirements are re-treads or the kinds of state and federal banking information and documentation requests or guidelines that are mostly customary and pro forma.

Thursday, March 8, 2012

The Cost of Consumer Financial Protection

Recently, I met with several accomplished compliance professionals for lunch. There was considerable discussion about the continuing growth of the regulatory frameworks, the bureaucracies to maintain them, and economic burden on financial institutions. *
One individual expressed the importance of financial protection of the consumer, while recognizing that such protection causes incremental compliance requirements; another individual agreed that such protection was needed, but worried that the costs to provide that protection would ultimately be borne by the consumer through increased pricing. 
In a way, these views reflect an ethical dilemma, and I would like to explore this seeming conundrum and offer a resolution.
IN THIS ARTICLE
An Unfettered Market
Pricing
Framework
Regulations
Protecting the Consumer
"Remember that credit is money."
Ethical Dilemma
Discussion Forum
An Unfettered Market
There is no political economy that we know of, since the dawn of recorded history, in which an unfettered market has existed.
Theories abound about how such a market might function. Whether we term such markets as "unfettered" or use the more emotionally appealing word "free," these markets are nonetheless only theories, howsoever popular in the public mind, and have virtually no extrapolation into economic reality. Better to call such theoretical legerdemain "utopian markets" and leave them to their rightful place in speculative philosophy and treatises on metaphysics.
Of course, utopias are attractive and always will be, even if we instinctively know that their viability is inherently unsupported by human experience and their imagined structure is ultimately dissolved in the unsentimental crucible of human history.
Pricing
All markets are a remunerative way of exchanging information, which we call goods and services. Pricing is that information means by which markets communicate value relative to goods and services. And pricing is communicated through the conveyance of planning.
Markets contain an element of planning - some in extreme, others much less so. The plan, or the framework, is often in control of market participants by virtue of the very act of pricing. It is not possible to remove pricing from a market. Even a market predicated on bartering utilizes the "quid pro quo" as its informational pricing signal.
Framework
In the absence of a framework there is no market. It is not the framework that encourages commerce; rather, it is the commerce itself that encourages the formation of the framework. Innovative commerce often bleeds through and beyond an old framework, thus creating the need for a new framework.
And there is often reactionary resistance to the new framework. Those market participants who are paying attention to the informational signals of a new market are already finding ways and means to act in the new framework, while those whose commerce has not kept pace with innovation tend to resist the change mightily, hopelessly trying to preserve what they have by "fighting the tape."
Regulations
Over the years I have found that the word "regulations" has become a euphemism for all manner of mischief perpetrated by politicians and market participants. Notice I differentiate the two: while some politicians may be market participants, most market participants are not politicians. Yet politicians spend quite a bit of their time crafting regulations! The mischief takes the form of viewing regulations as not only coercive (which they are) but also capricious (which they are not).
Both the politicians and the market participants rail on and on between and amongst each other about the coercion and the capriciousness of regulations, yet none of them ever really defines what actually is an efficient regulation. That is because, often, neither side has any idea how best to define such a thing.
But I'll define an "efficient regulation" right here and now:
An efficient regulation is the means by which the framework is preserved. Nothing more.
An inefficient regulation is the means by which the framework is destroyed. QED.

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

CFPB Issues “Early Warning Notice” Procedures

On November 7, 2011, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued its Bulletin 2011-04 (Enforcement), announcing plans to provide early warning of possible enforcement actions.
This CFPB bulletin outlined plans to provide advance notice of potential enforcement actions to individuals and firms under investigation, through a public notice process, called the Early Warning Notice.
The Early Warning Notice process is meant to allow the subject of an investigation to respond to any potential legal violations that CFPB enforcement staff believes have been committed before the Bureau ultimately decides whether to begin legal action.
OVERVIEW
The CFPB claims that the Early Warning Notice process is modeled on similar procedures that have been successful at other federal agencies.
The process begins with the Office of Enforcement explaining to individuals or firms that evidence gathered in a CFPB investigation indicates they have violated consumer financial protection laws.
Recipients of an Early Warning Notice are then invited to submit a response in writing, within 14 days, including any relevant legal or policy arguments and facts.
In July, the CFPB’s Office of Enforcement made public its rules regarding the initiation and execution of enforcement investigations.
The Early Warning Notice is not required by law, but CFPB believes it will promote even-handed enforcement of consumer financial laws. The decision to give notice in particular cases is discretionary and will depend on factors such as whether prompt action is needed.
EARLY WARNING NOTICE LETTER - SAMPLE
Before the Office of Enforcement recommends that the CFPB commence enforcement proceedings, the Office of Enforcement may give the subject of such recommendation notice of the nature of the subject's potential violations and may offer the subject the opportunity to submit a written statement in response.
The decision whether to give such notice is discretionary, and a notice may not be appropriate in some situations, such as in cases of ongoing fraud or when the Office of Enforcement needs to act quickly.
The objective of the notice is to ensure that potential subjects of enforcement actions have the opportunity to present their positions to the CFPB before an enforcement action is recommended or commenced.
RESPONDING TO THE “EARLY WARNING NOTICE” LETTER
The primary focus of the written statement in response should be legal and policy matters relevant to the potential enforcement proceedings.
Any factual assertions relied upon or present in the written statement must be made under oath by someone with personal knowledge of such facts.
Submissions may be discoverable by third parties in accordance with applicable law.
GUIDELINES FOR LETTER'S FORMAT
The written statement must:
-Be submitted on 8.5 by 11 inch paper
-Double spaced
-At least 12-point type
-No longer than 40 pages
-Be received by the CFPB no more than 14 calendar days after the Notice.
The written response statement should be sent to the CFPB staff conducting the investigation, and must clearly reference the specific investigation to which it relates.
If the Office of Enforcement ultimately recommends the commencement of an enforcement proceeding, the written statement will be included with that recommendation.
Persons involved in an investigation who wish to submit a written statement on their own initiative at any point during an investigation would follow the relevant procedures described above.
LIBRARY
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Early Warning Notice
Bulletin 2011-04
November 7, 2011
Sample Early Warning Notice
Bulletin 2011-04
November 7, 2011

Friday, July 8, 2011

CFPB: Defining "Larger Participant"

On June 29, 2011, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a request for comments regarding the requirement to implement a program to supervise certain nondepository covered persons for compliance with Federal consumer financial laws.
The scope of the CFPB's supervision coverage varies for different product markets. Section 1024 of the the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank) provides that the CFPB may supervise covered persons in the residential mortgage, private education lending, and payday lending markets. For other markets for consumer financial products or services, the supervision program generally will apply only to a ''larger participant'' of these markets.
Therefore, the CFPB is required to issue an initial ''larger participant'' rule not later than July 21, 2012, one year after the designated transfer date.
Essentially, under Dodd-Frank, the CFPB's non-bank supervision program will be able to look at companies of all sizes in the mortgage, payday lending, and private student lending markets. For all other markets - such as consumer installment loans, money transmitting, and debt collection - the CFPB generally can supervise non-banks only if they are larger participants in these markets.
Hence, in order to supervise them, the CFPB must write a rule within the next year to define who is a "larger participant."
The following outline is a brief synopsis of the questions requiring comments.
COMMENTS DUE DATE: AUGUST 15, 2011.
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Submit Comment-1
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THREE ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS
  • Should a larger participant be defined based on the relative size of the participants within a market (i.e., whether the number of annual transactions of the market participants is above the mean or median) or, alternatively, should a larger participant be defined based on an absolute threshold, such as doing business in a specified number of states?
  • Should more than one criterion be used to determine the size of a market participant, such as the number of annual transactions and/or the number of states in which the participant conducts business?
  • Should the same criteria and thresholds be used to define a larger participant for every market, or should different criteria and thresholds be tailored for each market based on the market's characteristics?
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SIZE = AGGREGATE = LARGER PARTICIPANT
In considering how to define which nondepository covered persons are larger participants in a particular market, a number of approaches are be suggested.
Determining the appropriate criteria and thresholds are being approached in light of the applicable statutory language, which refers to a ''larger participant'' of a market. (This statutory language is not limited only to the ''largest'' participants in each market, but at the same time does not encompass smaller market participants.)
Dodd-Frank provides that, for purposes of computing the activity levels of a market participant, the activities of the participant ''shall be aggregated'' with the activities of nondepositor ''affiliated companies.''
Examples of potential criteria that could be used to define larger participants of a market include one or a combination of the following: annual number of transactions in the market; annual value of transactions (i.e., total loan volume); annual receipts or revenue; geographic coverage (i.e., number of states where engaged in business); asset size; and outstanding loan balances.
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CRITERIA
  • The number of states in which a market participant conducts business. Public data, including from sources such as the Securities and Exchange Commission's online EDGAR database, and state and federal licensing and registration records.
  • Nonpublic state or federal supervisory or other data.
  • Commercial data, such as proprietary industry market analyses.
  • Data obtained directly from  market participants.
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REGISTRATION?
The CFPB is considering the establishment of a registration program for certain covered persons through a future rulemaking that will serve to supplement existing data used to measure market participants.
Questions:
  • For each market, what reliable data sources are available and would be suitable for the CFPB to use in its larger participant determinations?
  • What data should the CFPB collect through a registration process to use in its larger participant determinations?
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MEASUREMENT DATES AND SUPERVISION TIMEFRAMES
Questions:
  • What factors should the CFPB consider in connection with the treatment of events such as the merger market participants during an assessment time period?
  • Are there alternative approaches for establishing an assessment time period the CFPB should consider?
  • For what length of time should a market participant be subject to supervision once it meets the applicable threshold?
  • How should subsequent changes in the participant's size be treated?
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MARKETS
The CFPB seeks comments regarding the following markets: Debt Collection; Consumer Reporting; Consumer Credit and Related Activities; Money Transmitting, Check Cashing, and Related Activities; Prepaid Cards; and, Debt Relief Services.
Questions:
  • What consumer financial product or service markets should be included in the initial rule?
  • How should the financial product or service markets included in the initial rule be defined?
  • In addition to considerations relating to how to define the relevant product markets, should all markets be national in scope, or should the CFPB consider regional or other geographic markets in certain instances?
  • If regional or other geographic markets should be considered, describe with specificity how they could be defined?
  • What specific criteria should be measured, and threshold levels set, to define a larger participant in the markets identified above, and in any other markets that should be included in an initial rule?
  • What data should be used to assess whether the thresholds have been met?
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LIBRARY
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CFPB: Defining Larger Participants in Certain
Consumer Financial Products and Services Markets
Notice and Request for Comment. (12 CFR Chapter X)
Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 125
June 29, 2011
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