The Strange Case of the Shrinking Mini-Correspondent: A Primer on Forensics

WHITE PAPER

 Jonathan Foxx

President & Managing Director

There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact.

The Bascombe Valley Mystery

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

The predictable sometimes is predicted and sometimes it is not. Our biases tend to lead the way in determining a course of action based on perceived predictability. We find ways to convince ourselves that the obvious is not obvious and the necessary is really not essential. It is said that facts are stubborn things, but they are more like heat-seeking missiles if they bear ill-tidings. So, in finding the means toward a “workaround” or any method of circumventing or overcoming a problem, real or imagined, our hearty species indulges in an endless variety of obfuscations, bafflements, blinding bewilderments, miasmic confusion, discombobulating fogs of frenzy, perplexities of interests and foolish entanglements. All for the sake of avoiding ineluctable facts!

A characteristic feature of a predictable event is that it often becomes inevitable. When that happens, no manner of pleadings or remonstrations will undo the already done! It is not as if we did not know that the predictable could become the inevitable. Our biases simply refused to admit that our present plans will oneday meet their future denouement. And so it is that the strange case of the shrinking mini-correspondent took its course, gradually and inexorably, through the annals of mortgage banking to its current resting place on July 11, 2014, with the bloviatingly long title “Policy Guidance on Supervisory and Enforcement Considerations Relevant to Mortgage Brokers Transitioning to Mini-Correspondent Lenders.” Published by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”), the issuance is on its way to all supervised institutions as a Policy Guidance (“Guidance”) relating to the Bureau’s exercise of its authority to supervise and enforce compliance with RESPA and Regulation X and TILA and Regulation Z in certain transactions involving “mini-correspondent lenders”.[i]

The billowing wave of the mini-correspondent began as a trickle, intensified as lenders established “mini-correspondent channels,” and gushed into a modest torrent, its demand rising in prominence on January 10, 2014. For it was on this date that the proximate cause for the new mini-correspondent channel was given its impetus, due to the Final Rule pertaining to the Ability-to-Repay guidelines and the requirements of the Qualified Mortgage rule (“Rule”). Many brokers usually seek to charge fees between 2% and 3% per loan transaction; however, under the foregoing requirements, any excess above 3% in total points and fees virtually guarantees that such loans, originated by brokers, will not be eligible for treatment as a Qualified Mortgage (QM). A consequence of the Final Rule and specifically the 3% cap was to create an incentive for many brokers to morph into a new kind of loan originator, termed the “Mini-Correspondent.”

In September 2013, in anticipation of the Rule’s compliance effective date coming just months away, my colleague, Michael Barone,[ii] and I published a White Paper and article in which we discussed the challenges facing the mini-correspondent channel. The White Paper was entitled “The Mini-Correspondent Channel: Pros and Cons.”[iii] In the article’s penultimate section, titled "Mini-Correspondents and the CFPB," the following observation was made:

“Before concluding please consider these final points.

Has anyone given consideration as to what the CFPB might take as a position when a tremendous amount of mortgage brokers transform themselves into mini-correspondents with the primary purpose of avoiding QM’s 3% points and fees cap? We surely have, and so have many others. The CFPB has not commented on this issue, but you bet they will at some point down the road. 

It is possible that the CFPB will take no issue with mortgage brokers becoming mini-correspondents! After all, this has been done for years, and when done correctly, it has been a valuable intermediary step for a brokerage firm that wishes to transition from broker to lender. 

But would it shock anyone if the CFPB took issue with the mini-correspondent channel and tried to eliminate it to the extent it is used to avoid the 3% points and fees cap? This would not be difficult. The CFPB could modify the exception to loan originators of the entity that makes the credit decision or take any number of other actions to prevent the mini-correspondent channel from growing solely for the benefit of avoiding the 3% cap. For now, we have to wait and see what their position on mini-correspondents will be.”[iv]

We were not soothsayers or prophets. The facts, such as they were, the experience working with applicable mortgage acts and practices, and the regulatory compliance concerns of our clients, gave us a unique purview.

Are we now finding that the mini-correspondent wave is running its course, shrinking in momentum, and undulating to its demise? Let us explore the requirements and implications of the Guidance.[v] Perhaps we will find a way to solve the mystery at the heart of the mini-correspondent surge and derive some insight about its potential fate.

Eliminate all other factors, and the one which remains must be the truth.

The Sign of Four

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

Due to the Bureau becoming aware of the transitioning of mortgage brokers from their traditional roles to mini-correspondent lender roles, the CFPB has become concerned that some mortgage brokers may be shifting to the mini-correspondent model in the belief that, by identifying themselves as “mini-correspondent lenders,” they automatically alter the application of important consumer protections that apply to transactions involving mortgage brokers. The specific protections that the Bureau cites include provisions in RESPA and its implementing Regulation X,[vi] and TILA and its implementing Regulation Z.[vii] RESPA and TILA were amended by Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).[viii] On the compliance effective date of January 10, 2014, the Final Rule (issued in January 2013) required that Regulations X and Z apply certain requirements and prohibitions to compensation paid to a mortgage broker. 

An outline of applicable provisions, as they concern mortgage brokers and compensation, consist of the following four factors:

1.     Disclosure of mortgage broker compensation. 

Regulation X requires that the lender’s compensation to the mortgage broker be disclosed on the Good-Faith Estimate and HUD-1 Settlement Statement.[ix] However, payments received by the lender from an investor as compensation for a bona fide transfer of the loan in the secondary market need not be disclosed.[x]

2.     Inclusion of mortgage broker compensation in “points and fees.” 

Under Regulation Z, compensation paid to a mortgage broker by a consumer or creditor is included in points and fees for purposes of the points-and-fees cap for “qualified mortgages” and for the points-and-fees test for determining whether a mortgage is a “high-cost mortgage” under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).[xi]   But, the interest paid to a creditor is excluded in points and fees. Excluded also are any points and fees compensation a creditor receives from a third party that purchases the loan.[xii]

3.     Restrictions on mortgage broker compensation.

TILA and Regulation Z[xiii] prohibit certain compensation arrangements between creditors and loan originators, including mortgage brokers.[xiv]

Webinar: New Year, New Rules

Brokers Compliance Group is the Exclusive Compliance Provider of the National Association of Mortgage Brokers (NAMB) and an affiliate of Lenders Compliance Group.

In cooperation with NAMB, we will be providing a quarterly webinar series in 2014.

Each webinar will be devoted to an intense review of important regulatory compliance matters.

• If you are a client of the Lenders Compliance Group of companies, you are entitled to register for FREE.
• Each attendee must individually register.
• NAMB members receive special pricing.
• Non-members of NAMB and non-clients of ours may also register for a small fee.

Our first webinar in the series will be presented on January 30, 2014, at 2PM-EST. Because space is filling up quickly, due to announcements by NAMB and media organizations, we suggest you register as soon as possible.

We are pleased to offer this webinar to our valued clients and colleagues!

Regards,
Jonathan Foxx
President & Managing Director

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WEBINAR OVERVIEW

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DESCRIPTION

New Year, New Rules - Understanding and Implementing

Thursday, January 30, 2014 at 2PM-EST

Webinar Topics:

• How do the Ability-to-Repay (ATR) requirements affect my business?
  

• Qualified Mortgage (QM) and the inconsistent impact on lenders, brokers, and mortgage loan originators
  

• Obstacles and opportunities in Loan Officer Compensation amendments
  

• Lending in the new HOEPA requirements
  

• Appraisals: Latest rules affecting ECOA and Higher-Priced Mortgage Loans
  

In this 90-minute session, we'll discuss the regulatory compliance requirements that you need to implement right away.

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Fair Lending Compliance, Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgages

On October 22, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Bureau), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) (collectively, the Agencies) issued a statement in response to inquiries from creditors about whether they would be liable under the disparate impact doctrine of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) [15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq., and its implementing regulation, Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. Part 1002] by originating only Qualified Mortgages as defined under the Bureau's recent Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Rule (ATR Rule). The ATR Rule implements provisions of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).[1]

The Agencies' general approach and expectations regarding fair lending, including the disparate impact doctrine, are summarized in prior issuances.[2]

The Agencies state that they are issuing this statement to describe some general principles that will guide supervisory and enforcement activities with respect to entities within their jurisdiction as the Ability-to-Repay Rule takes effect in January 2014. Per the Agencies, the requirements of the Ability-to-Repay Rule and ECOA are compatible. ECOA and Regulation B promote creditors acting on the basis of their legitimate business needs.[3]

Therefore, the Agencies do not anticipate that a creditor's decision to offer only Qualified Mortgages would, absent other factors, elevate a supervised institution's fair lending risk.

The Bureau's Ability-to-Repay Rule implements provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that require creditors to make a reasonable, good faith determination that a consumer has the ability to repay a mortgage loan before extending the consumer credit.[4] TILA and the Ability-to-Repay Rule create a presumption of compliance with the ability-to-repay requirements for certain "Qualified Mortgages," which are subject to certain restrictions as to risky features, limitations on upfront points and fees, and specialized underwriting requirements.

Consistent with the statutory framework, there are several ways to satisfy the Ability-to-Repay Rule, including, according to the Agencies, making responsibly underwritten loans that are not Qualified Mortgages.

The Bureau does not believe that it is possible to define by rule every instance in which a mortgage is affordable for the borrower. Nonetheless, the Agencies are recognizing that some creditors might be inclined to originate all or predominantly Qualified Mortgages, particularly when the Ability-to-Repay Rule first takes effect. The Rule includes transition mechanisms that encourage preservation of access to credit during this transition period.

Furthermore, according to the issuance, the Agencies expect that creditors, in selecting their business models and product offerings, would consider “demonstrable factors” that may include credit risk, secondary market opportunities, capital requirements, and liability risk. The Ability-to-Repay Rule does not dictate precisely how creditors should balance such factors, nor do either TILA or ECOA. Consequently, as creditors assess their business models, the Agencies are clearly stating they understand that implementation of the Ability-to-Repay Rule, other Dodd-Frank Act regulations, and other changes in economic and mortgage market conditions have real world impacts and that creditors may have a legitimate business need to fine tune their product offerings over the next few years in response.

Importantly, the Agencies seem to be recognizing that some creditors' existing business models are such that all of the loans they originate will already satisfy the requirements for Qualified Mortgages. An example given is where a creditor has decided to restrict its mortgage lending only to loans that are purchasable on the secondary market might find that - in the current market - are Qualified Mortgages under the transition provision. Thereby giving Qualified Mortgage status to most loans that are eligible for purchase, guarantee, or insurance by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or certain federal agency programs.

With respect to any fair lending risk, the Agencies claim that situation here is not substantially different from what creditors have historically faced in developing product offerings or responding to regulatory or market changes. The decisions creditors will make about their product offerings in response to the Ability-to-Repay Rule are similar to the decisions that creditors have made in the past with regard to other significant regulatory changes affecting particular types of loans.

An example provided is where some creditors may have decided not to offer "higher-priced mortgage loans" after July 2008 (viz., following the adoption of various rules regulating these loans or previously decided not to offer loans subject to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act after regulations to implement that statute were first adopted in 1995). There were no ECOA or Regulation B challenges to those decisions.

Inevitably, creditors should continue to evaluate fair lending risk as they would for other types of product selections, including by carefully monitoring their policies and practices and implementing effective compliance management systems. As with any other compliance matter, individual cases will be evaluated on their own merits.

The OCC, the Board, the FDIC, and the NCUA believe that the same principles described above apply in supervising institutions for compliance with the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and its implementing regulation, 24 C.F.R. Part 100.[5]

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[1] See http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/ability-to-repay-and-qualified-mortgage-standards-under-the-truth-in-lending-act-regulation-z/. Disparate impact is one of the methods of proving lending discrimination under ECOA. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 & Supp. I.
[2] For instance, in 1994, eight federal agencies published the Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266 (Apr. 15, 1994), and last year the Bureau issued a bulletin on lending discrimination, CFPB Bulletin 2012-04 (Fair Lending) (Apr. 18, 2012). In addition, the OCC, Board, FDIC, NCUA, and Bureau each have fair lending examination procedures.
[3] Even where a facially neutral practice results in a disproportionately negative impact on a protected class, a creditor is not liable provided the practice meets a legitimate business need that cannot reasonably be achieved as well by means that are less disparate in their impact. See 12 C.F.R. §1002.6; 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002, Supp. I, § 1002.6, ¶ 6(a)-2.
[4] Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c).
[5] The OCC, Board, FDIC, and the NCUA have supervisory authority as to the FHA.

HUD’s Safe and Rebuttable Qualified Mortgages

The anxiously awaited Proposed Rule (“Rule”) outlining the Qualified Mortgage for FHA loans was published in the Federal Register on September 30, 2013. Given the bland, bureaucratic title Qualified Mortgage Definition for HUD Insured and Guaranteed Single Family Mortgages (“Issuance”), HUD is submitting for public comment its definition of a “qualified mortgage” for the types of loans that HUD insures, guarantees, or administers that align with the statutory ability-to-repay (“ATR”) criteria of the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”) and the regulatory criteria of the definition given by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), without departing from HUD’s statutory requirements. The expiration of the comment period is October 30, 2013.

A copy of the Proposed Rule is available in our Library.

In this article, I will provide an overview of the Rule with respect to Title II mortgages of the National Housing Act. I shall offer some practical insights relating to the potential consequences and implementation of the Rule for residential mortgage lenders and originators.*

Birthing HUD’s Proposed Rule

The Rule has its genesis in a foundational document, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), which created the new section 129C in TILA, establishing minimum standards for considering a consumer’s repayment ability for creditors originating certain closed-end, dwelling-secured mortgages, and generally prohibiting a creditor from originating a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination of a consumer’s ability to repay the loan according to its terms.

Briefly, Section 129C is meant to provide lenders a specific format to meet the ATR requirements when lenders make “qualified mortgages” (“QMs”). A new section 129C(b), added by section 1412 of Dodd-Frank, establishes the presumption that the ATR requirements of section 129C(a) are satisfied if a mortgage is a “qualified mortgage,’’ and authorizes the CFPB, to prescribe regulations that revise, add to, or subtract from the criteria in TILA that define a “qualified mortgage.’’ (Section 129C also provides for a reverse mortgage to be a qualified mortgage if the mortgage meets the CFPB’s standards for a qualified mortgage, except to the extent that reverse mortgages are statutorily exempted altogether from the ATR requirements. The CFPB’s regulations provide that the ATR requirements of section 129C(a) do not apply to reverse mortgages. Section 129C(a)(8) excludes reverse mortgages from the repayment ability requirements.)

As you may know, I have published and presented extensively on QMs and have dubbed the non-qualified mortgage with the acronym “NQM.” For some of my work on this subject, please visit HERE, and HERE, and HERE.

Section 129C authorizes the agency with responsibility for compliance with TILA, that is, the CFPB, to issue a rule implementing these requirements. The CFPB already set forth its Final Rule on ATR, QMs, and NQMs, as issued in the Federal Register on January 30, 2013. Along with certain other agencies, HUD was also later on charged by the CFPB, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, with prescribing regulations defining the types of loans that it would insure, guarantee, or administer, as applicable, that are qualified mortgages. In the Rule, HUD now proposes that any forward single family mortgage insured or guaranteed by HUD must meet the criteria of a qualified mortgage, as defined in the Rule.

HUD reviewed its mortgage insurance and loan guarantee programs and, in the Issuance, stated that all of the single family residential mortgage and loan products offered under HUD programs are qualified mortgages; that is, they “exclude risky features and are designed so that the borrower can repay the loan.” However, for certain of its mortgage products, HUD proposes its Rule for qualified mortgage standards similar to those established by the CFPB in its definition of “qualified mortgage.” 

Safe Harbor and Rebuttable Presumption of Compliance

Through its “qualified mortgage” rulemaking, the CFPB established both a “safe harbor” and a “rebuttable presumption of compliance” for transactions that are qualified mortgages. CFPB's label of safe harbor is applied to those mortgages that are not higher-priced covered transactions (i.e., the annual percentage rate (“APR”) does not exceed the average prime offer rate (“APOR”) by 1.5 percent). These are considered to be the least risky loans and presumed to have conclusively met the ATR requirements of TILA. The label of rebuttable presumption of compliance is applied to those mortgages that are higher-priced transactions.

TILA Section 129C(b)(2)(ix) provides that the term “qualified mortgage” may include a “residential mortgage loan” that is “a reverse mortgage which meets the standards for a qualified mortgage, as set by the Bureau in rules that are consistent with the purposes of this subsection.” But the Federal Reserve Board’s proposal, adopted by the CFPB, does not include reverse mortgages in the definition of a “qualified mortgage.” Indeed, the CFPB’s Final Rule does not define a “qualified” reverse mortgage.

HUD proposes to designate Title I (home improvement loans), Section 184 (Indian housing loans), and Section 184A (Native Hawaiian housing loans) insured mortgages and guaranteed loans covered by the Rule to be safe harbor qualified mortgages and HUD proposes no changes to the underwriting requirements of these mortgage and loan products.

The largest volume of HUD mortgage products - those insured under Title II of the National Housing Act – would be bifurcated into qualified mortgages similar to the two categories created in the CFPB final rule: a safe harbor qualified mortgage and a rebuttable presumption qualified mortgage.

Specifically, the Rule would define the safe harbor qualified mortgage as a mortgage insured under Title II of the National Housing Act (excepting reverse mortgages insured under section 255 of this act) that meets the points and fees limit adopted by the CFPB in its regulation at 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(3), and that has an APR for a first-lien mortgage relative to the APOR that is less than the sum of the annual mortgage insurance premium (“MIP”) and 1.15 percentage points. HUD would define a rebuttable presumption qualified mortgage as a single family mortgage insured under Title II of the National Housing Act (excepting reverse mortgages insured under section 255 of this act) that meets the points and fees limit adopted by the CFPB in its regulation at 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(3), but has an APR that exceeds the APOR for a comparable mortgage, as of the date the interest rate is set, by more than the sum of the annual MIP and 1.15 percentage points for a first-lien mortgage.

Therefore, under the Rule, HUD would require that all loans insured under Title II of the National Housing Act to be either a rebuttable presumption or safe harbor qualified mortgage, and, importantly, that they meet the CFPB’s points and fees limit at 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(3). The CFPB set a three (3%) percentage points and fees limit for its definition of qualified mortgage and allowed for adjustments of this limit to facilitate the presumption of compliance for smaller loans. 

The Mini-Correspondent Channel: Pros and Cons

Several years ago, our firm, Lenders Compliance Group, provided unique guidance to the mortgage division of a bank.* The bank wished to build a special origination platform for its mortgage brokers. At that time, the prevailing regulations required disclosure of the Yield Spread Premium (YSP), and the bank wanted to give their Third Party Originators (TPOs) an opportunity to close in their own name, with their own funds, and, among other things, by-pass disclosure of the YSP. In building the platform for the bank, many features were needed to implement these relationships in accordance with federal and state law, as well as safety and soundness metrics. This all took place at a time when a 3% fee cap on broker revenue was not even a glimmer in the eyes of legislators or regulators, and Elizabeth Warren[i] had yet to promote the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).

As Shakespeare wrote in The Tempest, “What’s past is prologue.”

Since the early part of this year, many lenders are building a new origination channel. The proximate cause for the new channel is found in the Final Rule pertaining to the Ability-to-Repay guidelines and the requirements of a Qualified Mortgage (Rule).[ii]

The new channel is meant specifically for brokers who hope to by-pass a 3% cap on loan amounts above $100,000, the new CFPB requirement that substantially and principally affects broker TPOs.[iii] The loans covered by the Rule are first lien and junior lien mortgage loans that are closed-end mortgage loans secured by a dwelling, including home purchase, refinance and home equity loans. (Excluded loans are HELOCs; Timeshares; Reverses; Bridges with a term of 12 months or less and loans to purchase a new dwelling where the consumer plans to sell another dwelling within 12 months; Vacant Lot loans; Loan Modifications not subject to the "refinancing" provisions under TILA; and Business Loans.)[iv]

In particular, many brokers usually seek to charge fees between 2% and 3% per loan transaction; however, as of January 10, 2014,[v] any excess above 3% in total points and fees virtually guarantees that such loans, originated by brokers, will not be eligible for treatment as a Qualified Mortgage (QM). The result of the Final Rule and specifically the 3% cap is to create an incentive for many brokers to morph into a new kind of correspondent, termed the “Mini-Correspondent.” The new origination channel developed by some wholesale lenders is aptly called the “Mini-Correspondent Channel.”

One of us, Jonathan Foxx, has written extensively – both in magazine articles and newsletters – about the Ability-to-Repay guidelines (ATR), the Qualified Mortgage, and the Non-Qualified Mortgage (viz., which he has titled the “NQM”). For additional details and guidance, please read those publications.[vi]

In this article, we are going to explore two interrelated issues. First, we will discuss the 3% cap, its implementation and placement within the QM framework, and the way it affects the originations of the mortgage broker. To do that, we will provide the QM framework into which the 3% cap is situated. Secondly, we will discuss the structure of and certain requirements relating to a mini-correspondent TPO. Bear in mind that this new type of TPO is taking place in a dynamic regulatory environment and loan origination market; therefore, aspects of our observations may change, due to a regulatory response, or other material factors, that pertain to originating loans through this new channel. 

Two Classes of Qualified Mortgages

Essentially, the Rule creates two types of QMs, one of which provides a safe harbor from liability and another which does not provide a safe harbor, but does offer a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the Rule. Obviously, the former is preferred, though the latter is not without its merits.

The safe harbor is only available if the creditor complies with all aspects of the Rule, including, at minimum, all the ATR guidelines, and where the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) on a first lien loan must be within 1.5 percentage points of the “average prime offer rate” (APOR) as of the date the interest rate is set (viz., the APR on a junior lien must be within 3.5 percentage points of the APOR).[vii] If the APR threshold is exceeded, the creditor has a rebuttable presumption of compliance.

The distinction between the safe harbor and rebuttable presumption is very significant. With the safe harbor, a lender obtains a conclusive presumption of compliance and may refute a claim that it violated the Rule, such as not complying with the ATR guidelines. But if the lender obtains only a rebuttable presumption of compliance, a claim can be litigated on the basis of a creditor not making a “reasonable” and “good faith” determination of the borrower’s ability to repay, irrespective of a lender’s complying fully with various aspects of the Rule, such as the ATR guidelines.

The ATR test promulgated by the Rule consists of eight factors. Neither the safe harbor nor the rebuttable presumption is available to a lender solely because a loan is underwritten to the ATR test’s guidelines. The ATR factors require the lender to underwrite and verify (1) current or reasonably expected income or assets, other than the value of the dwelling, (2) current employment status (viz., if the creditor is relying on employment income), (3) monthly payment, (4) monthly payment on any “simultaneous loan” of which the creditor is (or should be) aware, (5) mortgage-related obligations, (6) current debt obligations (including alimony, palimony, and child support), (7) monthly Debt-to-Income (DTI) ratio or residual income, and (8) borrower credit history. It should be noted that the ATR test itself does not place limits on points and fees. 

Qualified Mortgage and the 3% Cap

As mentioned above, a QM with an APR that does not exceed the APOR thresholds receives a safe harbor from liability (i.e., compliance with the ATR guidelines). If the APOR thresholds are exceeded, this means that the loan is a higher-priced QM, and, as such, receives the rebuttable presumption of compliance. In effect, the two classes of QM constitute a prime and non-prime market, with the prime entitled to safe harbor and the non-prime entitled to a rebuttable presumption.[viii]

But there are several challenges that a lender must overcome in order to use the safe harbor defense, one of which is the 3% cap. The Rule excludes from the points and fees 3% cap any compensation paid, per transaction, by a mortgage broker to an employee of the mortgage broker and compensation paid by a creditor to its loan officers. Compensation paid by a creditor to a loan originator other than an employee of the creditor (i.e., paid to a broker by a creditor on a lender paid transaction) is included in the 3% cap along with other upfront charges paid by the consumer to the creditor or its affiliates.[ix] Furthermore, the 3% cap includes certain fees paid to affiliates, mortgage originator compensation paid directly or indirectly by the consumer, and amounts imposed by secondary market investors and passed through to borrowers to compensate for credit risk. When these "points and fees" are factored into the loan origination costs, many loans will exceed the 3% limit.[x] 

Revolving Door Regulators

Senator yesterday. Lobbyist today.

Representative yesterday. CEO today.

Cabinet level appointee yesterday. Bank Chairperson today.

Government Agency Director yesterday. Law firm senior partner today.

CFPB Regulator yesterday. Competitor today.

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IN THIS ARTICLE

The Inside-Outside Gambit

The Four Horsemen

A Business Model for Former Regulators

Partners in Business

Making a Market in Non-QM

Timeline

What did they know, and when did they know it?

Extinguishing the Fire

Library

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The Inside-Outside Gambit

There are many forms of corruption. Perhaps the most pernicious is where an elected or duly appointed representative of the citizenry leaves office to use the sloughed off position for financial gain in the private sector.

Let's set up a definition for such (mostly unregulated) behavior. I will give it a phrase: "inside-outside gambits."

What is an inside-outside gambit? It is the use of information obtained in the course of a former governmental position by an official for financial gain, directly or indirectly, soon or immediately after leaving government employment in that position. Such information includes contacts with decision-makers in the government; providing information about proprietary conversations leading up to the promulgating of laws, rules, and regulations; access to insiders and knowledge of their views; navigating the systemic and organizational structure; non-public facts regarding the governmental plans or condition that could provide a financial advantage. Note that I use the phrase "inside-outside," not "insider trading."

I am not talking about a situation where there is the illegal trading of a public company's stock or other securities (such as bonds or stock options) by individuals with access to non-public information about the subject company (such trading being illegal).

However, the effect of “inside-outside gambit” and “insider trading” is practically the same: these strategies lead to an unfair, usually economic, advantage.

A basic concept of law is that an injury must be sustained by a plaintiff. Broadly speaking, no injury, no case.

So who is harmed when an equity trader uses inside information for personal financial benefit? The public, of course. Certainly, that part of the public that invests in the stock market, relying on rules, regulations, and laws to be impartially applied, with equal access to all. And who is harmed when a former government official uses inside information for personal financial benefit almost immediately after being employed in the government position. Of course, the public. Certainly, that part of the public that relies on rules, regulations, and laws to be impartially applied, with equal access to all.

How about when regulators in the most powerful agency that regulates the origination of residential mortgage loans, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), leave that agency and start a mortgage company soon after leaving the CFPB, to compete or partner with mortgage companies?

GSEs: Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgages

Yesterday, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) announced that it is directing Fannie Mae ("Fannie") and Freddie Mac ("Freddie") to limit their future mortgage acquisitions to loans that meet the requirements for a qualified mortgage ("qualified mortgage" or "QM"), including those that meet the special or temporary qualified mortgage definition, and loans that are exempt from the “ability to repay” ("ATR") requirements under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).

In January, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a final rule implementing the “ability to repay” provisions of Dodd-Frank, including certain protections from liability for loans that meet the criteria of a qualified mortgage as outlined in the rule.

We have discussed the ability to repay provisions HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE, and HERE.

I would like to call your attention to a few important details.*

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IN THIS ARTICLE

Overview

Eligible for Sale to Fannie and Freddie

Additional Guidance and Notifications

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Overview

Considered historically, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a final rule on January 10, 2013, implementing the “ability to repay” provisions of the Dodd-Frank. That rule generally requires lenders to make a reasonable, good faith determination of a consumer’s ability to repay before originating a mortgage loan and establishes certain protections from liability for QMs.

The ATR rule takes effect for applications dated on or after January 10, 2014.

It is significant that, beginning January 10, 2014, Fannie and Freddie will no longer purchase a loan that is subject to the ATR rule if the loan:

• is not fully amortizing,

• has a term of longer than 30 years, or

• includes points and fees in excess of three percent of the total loan amount, or such other limits for low balance loans as set forth in the rule.

The FHFA announcement states that "effectively, this means Fannie and Freddie will not purchase interest-only loans, loans with 40-year terms, or those with points and fees exceeding the thresholds established by the rule."

Fannie and Freddie will continue to purchase loans that meet the underwriting and delivery eligibility requirements stated in their respective selling guides. This includes loans that are processed through their automated underwriting systems and loans with a debt-to-income ratio of greater than 43 percent. But loans with a debt-to-income ratio of more than 43 percent are not eligible for protection as QMs under the CFPB’s final rule unless they are eligible for purchase by Fannie and Freddie under the special or temporary qualified mortgage definition. 

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Eligible for Sale to Fannie and Freddie

Just a few days ago, on May 2, 2013, the FHFA directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to limit future acquisitions to loans that:

• are qualified mortgages under the ability to repay rule, including those meeting the special or temporary qualified mortgage requirements; or

• are exempt from the ability to repay requirements, such as investor transactions.

Thus, effective for mortgages with application dates on or after January 10, 2014, Fannie and Freddie will not be allowed to purchase any loans if they are subject to the ATR requirements and are either:

• loans that are not fully amortizing (e.g., no negative amortization or interest-only loans);

• loans with terms in excess of 30 years (e.g., no 40-year terms); or

• loans with points and fees in excess of 3% of the total loan amount or such other limits for low balance loans as set forth in the ability to repay final rule.

Fannie will continue to purchase loans that meet the underwriting and delivery eligibility requirements (i.e., existing debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios, and reserves) stated in the Selling Guide, including loans processed through Desktop Underwriter®.

Freddie will limit future purchases to:

• Mortgages that are “qualified mortgages” under the final rule, including those meeting the special or temporary qualified mortgage requirements, and

• Mortgages that are exempt from the ATR, such as investor transactions.

Therefore, effective for mortgages subject to the final rule with applications received on or after January 10, 2014, Freddie will not be permitted to purchase the following:

• Mortgages that are not fully amortizing (e.g., Mortgages with a potential for negative amortizations or interest-only Mortgages);

• Mortgages with terms in excess of 30 years (i.e, 40-year fixed-rate Mortgages); and,

• Mortgages with points and fees in excess of 3% of the total loan amount or such other limits for low balance Mortgages as set forth in the final rule.

CFPB’s Final Rule: Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgages

Yesterday, I provided an outline of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB's) Regulatory Agenda for 2013. As if on cue, the CFPB has accommodated us today with the first of its forthcoming issuances.* This pertains to the Final Rule regarding Ability-to-Repay, which leaves the Final Rule issuances this month for Loan Originator Compensation, Mortgage Servicing, and Requirements for Escrow Accounts.

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) required that, for residential mortgages, creditors must make a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and documented information that the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan according to its terms. It also established a "presumption" of compliance for a certain category of mortgages, which was called “qualified mortgages” or "QMs." These provisions are similar, but not identical to, the Federal Reserve Board's (FRB's) 2008 rule and cover the entire mortgage market rather than simply higher-priced mortgages. The FRB proposed a rule to implement the new statutory requirements before authority passed to the CFPB to finalize the rule. 

I have written extensively about Ability-to-Repay and the Qualified Mortgage. 

Please feel free to review these articles.

In this article, I would like to mention the premises used as the reasons for an Ability-to-Repay rule (ATR). Then I will outline the essential features of ATR, followed by a review of the "Qualified Mortgage." Finally, I will provide a general summation in order to provide some context with respect to the Final Rule's implementation.

_________________________________________________

IN THIS ARTICLE

Premises for Ability-to-Repay
What is Ability-to-Repay?
What is the Qualified Mortgage?
Types of Qualified Mortgages
Summation

Library

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Premises for Ability-to-Repay

The CFPB believes that when consumers apply for a mortgage they "often struggle to understand how much of a monthly payment they can afford to take on." Thus, according to the CFPB, the consumer may reasonably assume that lenders and mortgage brokers would not make loans to people who cannot afford them. But in the years leading up to the financial crisis, the CFPB asserts that lenders too often made mortgages that could not be paid back.

Therefore, the purpose of ATR is to require lenders to obtain and verify information to determine whether a consumer can afford to repay the mortgage and, per the CFPB, thereby help to restore trust in the mortgage market.

These are the premises upon which the CFPB has established the need for Ability-to-Repay:

-In the lead up to the financial crisis, certain lending practices set consumers up to fail with mortgages they could not afford.

-The deterioration in underwriting standards contributed to dramatic increases in mortgage delinquencies and rates of foreclosures.

-The Dodd-Frank Act recognizes the need to mandate that lenders ensure consumers have the ability to pay back their mortgages.

-The Ability-to-Repay rule protects consumers from risky practices that helped cause the crisis.

In its review of the above-mentioned premises, the CFPB had taken the position that lenders sold no-doc and low-doc loans where consumers were “qualifying” for loans beyond their means. Lenders also "sold risky and complicated mortgages like interest-only loans, negative-amortization loans where the principal and eventually the monthly payment increases, hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages where the rate was set artificially low for years and then adjusted upwards, and option adjustable-rate mortgages where the consumer could 'pick a payment' which might result in negative amortization and eventually higher monthly payments."

In plain English, the CFPB asserts that lenders should not be able to offer no-doc, low-doc loans, otherwise known as “Alt-A” loans, where some lenders made quick sales by not requiring specific, qualifying documentation, yet then offloaded these risky mortgages by selling them to investors.

As it was contended, these actions precipitated the collapse of the housing market in 2008 and the subsequent financial crisis.

Dodd-Frank provides the authority to the CFPB to define criteria for certain loans called “Qualified Mortgages” that are presumed to meet the Ability-to-Repay rule requirements.

The salient observation about ATR is that the CFPB is issuing this rule in order "to ensure that responsible consumers get responsible loans," as well as ensuring that "lenders can extend credit responsibly - without worrying about competition from unscrupulous lenders."

CFPB: Re-Opening "Ability-to-Repay"

On June 5, 2012, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Bureau) announced that it is "reopening the comment period" for the proposed rule, issued on May 11, 2011 by the Federal Reserve Board (Board), addressing the new ability-to-repay requirements that generally will apply to consumer credit transactions secured by a dwelling and the definition of a "qualified mortgage."

The ability-to-repay requirements were set forth in the May 11, 2011 proposal to amend Regulation Z (the implementing regulation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to implement amendments to TILA made by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).

Since then, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the Board's rulemaking authority for TILA was transferred to the Bureau as of July 21, 2011. The original comment period to the proposed rule closed on July 22, 2011.

The Bureau is reopening the comment period until July 9, 2012 to seek comment specifically on certain new data and information submitted during or obtained after the close of the original comment period.

I have written extensively about the ability-to-repay. And I would urge you to read some of these articles to become familiar with these important requirements:*

Ability-to-Repay: Regulating or Underwriting? Part I
Ability-to-Repay: Regulating or Underwriting? Part II
Ability-to-Repay: The Basics and a Chart
Ability-to-Repay: The Chart
Ability-to-Repay: Additional Analysis
FRB: Proposes Rule - Ability-to-Repay

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IN THIS ARTICLE

History

New Data

Questions and Comments

Litigation and Liability

Foreclosure

Litigants and Complaints

Outcomes from Litigation

Factors or Costs

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History

Sections 1411, 1412, and 1414 of the Dodd-Frank created new TILA section 129C, which, among other things, established new ability-to-pay requirements. If a mortgage is a so-called "qualified mortgage," the compliance with the ability-to-repay rule would offer a presumption of compliance.

The word 'presumption' is a dispositive word in this proposal. Please keep the phrase "presumption of compliance" in mind as you read through this brief outline.

On May 11, 2011, the Board published for notice and comment a proposed ability-to-repay rule, amending Regulation Z to implement new TILA section 129C. The comment period for this initial proposal closed on July 22, 2011.

Then, on July 21, 2011 Dodd-Frank transferred the Board's rulemaking authority for TILA, among other consumer financial protection laws, to the Bureau. Accordingly, all comment letters on the proposed rule were also transferred to the Bureau. According to the Bureau, in response to the proposed rule approximately 1800 comment letters were received from numerous commenters, including members of Congress, lenders, consumer groups, trade associations, mortgage and real estate market participants, and individual consumers.

Even after the comment period closed, various interested parties, including industry and consumer group commenters, submitted to the Bureau oral and written ex parte presentations on the proposed rule.

Through various comment letters, ex parte communications, and the Bureau's own collection of data, the Bureau has received additional information and new data pertaining to the proposed rule.

The Bureau is now interested in providing opportunity for additional public comment on these materials. Thus, it is reopening the comment period until July 9, 2012, in order to request comments specifically on certain additional information or new data, but not other aspects of the proposed rule already submitted previously.

So, what are the new data?

New Data

The Bureau now seeks comment on mortgage loan data that the Bureau has received from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). To date, the Bureau has received a sample drawn from the FHFA's Historical Loan Performance (HLP) data along with tabulations from the entire file.

The data include a one percent random sample of all mortgage loans in the HLP data from 1997 through 2011. Tabulations of the HLP data by the FHFA show the number of loans and performance of those loans by year and debt-to-income (DTI) range.

The HLP data consists of all mortgage loans purchased or guaranteed by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) (jointly, the GSEs), but does not include loans backing private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBS) bought by the GSEs.

The data contains loan-level information on characteristics and performance of all single-family mortgages purchased or guaranteed by the GSEs. FHFA updates the HLP data quarterly with information from each GSE.

Among other elements, the data includes product type; payment-to-income and debt-to-income (PTI/DTI) ratios at origination; initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratios based on the purchase price or appraised property value and the first-lien balance; and credit scores.

The Bureau proposes to use these data to tabulate volumes and performance of loans with varying characteristics and to perform other statistical analyses that may assist the Bureau in defining loans with characteristics that make it appropriate to presume that the lender complied with the ability-to-pay requirements or assist the Bureau in assessing the benefits and costs to consumers, including access to credit, and covered persons of, as well as the market share covered by, alternative definitions of a "qualified mortgage."

Riding the Horse Backwards

At a DC conference, dauntingly titled Mortgage Regulatory Forum, Barney Frank, the Congressman from Massachusetts whose name eponymously joins Dodd in the landmark Dodd-Frank Act, spoke about a "revolt" against the risk retention regulations embodied in the Qualified Residential Mortgage rules required by that Act.

We've heard about this risk retention requirement by its euphemistic cognate, rather barbarically described as to "keep skin in the game." I will be publishing a comprehensive article soon about the Act's provision regarding this "skin in the game" mandate. And I will see that you get a copy of the article. For the time being, though, maybe we should reflect a bit on Congressman Frank's worries.

But first, before speculating on Frank's musings about a revolution, let's begin with a story.

Snideley Whiplash and Dudley Do-Right

You might remember the cartoon character Dudley Do-Right of the "Dudley Do-Right of the Mounties" series, a part of the Rocky and Bullwinkle show. Dudley was forever saving Nell Fenwick, Mountie Inspector Fenwick's beautiful daughter, from the machinations of the evil Snideley Whiplash and Tuque, his equally nefarious sidekick. Whereas Dudley is garbed in the bold red uniform with shiny gold buttons of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Snidely wears black on black: suit, cape, stove pipe hat, boots - even a black, twisted, handlebar moustache.

Snidely was bent on doing naughty things to the hapless Nell, like tying her to a railroad track. And Snideley's arrogance was only exceeded by his sheer joy when conniving some evil exploit to be perpetrated on the innocent.

But Dudley would save Nell, usually just by dumb luck, free her from the railroad tracks, and boldly stand before her in a puffed-up, prideful "my hero" pose. And then Nell would thrillingly come running into Dudley's open arms, thanking him profusely for saving her!

Actually, no. Nell never did run into Dudley's arms. That just never happened. Not even once!

In fact, Nell would show her gratitude not to Dudley but to Dudley's horse, aptly named Horse, also dressed up like a Mountie. Dudley often rode Horse backwards, galloping boldly to the scenes of Snideley's pernicious schemes.

Even when Dudley had freed Nell from the chains holding her to the railroad tracks, she would hardly notice him. Instead, she gently stroked Horse's snout and elicited his big, charming, toothy smile. For the most part, Nell ignored Dudley, even when he saved her from Snideley's perilous plans.

Poor Dudley Do-Right! He really never did get the grateful recognition he thought he deserved. He never did win Nell's hand in romance. And yet Dudley never gave up on seeing himself as the bold hero responding with courageous alacrity to Nell's call of distress!

"Skin in the Game"

In a proposed rule issued by federal financial regulators, and pursuant to Dodd-Frank, there will soon be a requirement for sponsors of certain asset-backed securities to retain at least 5% of the credit risk of the assets underlying the securities. For "asset-backed securities" read mortgage securitizations. This is being referred to as "risk retention," or that "skin in the game" phrase I mentioned above.

According to those in favor of risk retention, the purpose of this rule is to coalesce underwriting guidelines into an incentivized alignment with securitizers and investors, through promoting a certain set of underwriting standards. The risk retention provision would exempt asset-backed securities that are collateralized exclusively by residential mortgages that are eligible as "qualified residential mortgages," now known, of course, as QRMs.

Many regulators have signed on to the QRM and risk retention provisions, since their view essentially is that "credit risk retention," the name given to the QRM concept, should be required because they believe it encourages prudent underwriting and securitization.

However, consider this: it is simply not known if 5% is even the appropriate amount of risk to be retained in order to align incentives! Indeed, there is scant statistical support for any such percentage whatsoever.

From a Distance

From a high altitude of consideration, the composite criteria of a QRM are the "plain vanilla" variety perfectly familiar to residential mortgage loan originators: 80% LTV; 20% down payment plus closing costs; 28% front-end ratio, and 36% back-end ratio.

Underwriting to the QRM guidelines means that securities backed by QRMs will not require securitizers to retain credit risk. Of course, there's far more to what constitutes a QRM and how it is structured. 

Recently, I spoke with a supervising prudential regulator, an old friend, and asked if QRM will crowd out the development of other products that could serve the consumer. His view was that the QRM criteria allow for innovation and, in any event, if they adversely affect a consumer's access to credit, then QRM standards may need to be changed. I must admit, I do not find that response very satisfying.

Markets are active, not passive. Much too often, though, regulatory requirements tend to be reactive, rather than responsive, mostly due to politicians catering to their constituencies and lobbyists. Since when did politicians and regulators so fully replace market action or override underwriting models that lenders undertake as part of making a market, pricing in risk, and developing loan products that respond to consumer needs?

"Revolt"

Congressman Frank seems to have concluded that the recent economic meltdown was largely caused by the housing bubble - presumably, that would be the housing bubble that he declared would never take place. So, "credit risk retention" is now being advanced as a policy that can help to avoid another housing bubble.

Here's the prevailing narrative: in 2008 and 2009, we went into the Great Recession, and now we're experiencing high unemployment and weak growth. Was the housing bubble the ultimate cause?

Most people seem to think so. They believe that the housing bubble burst in 2006 and led to a severe financial crisis in 2008, intensifying a recession that had begun in December 2007. And the Fed did what it could, through targeting inflation to prevent the crash, but could not stem the tide.

Here's another narrative, one actually supported by facts: the housing crash did not lead directly to a recession or high unemployment, although it seems to have been a proximate cause.

More than two-thirds of the decline in housing construction happened between January 2006 and April 2008. During that period, though, the unemployment rate rose only slightly, from 4.7% to just 4.9%. And statistics demonstrate that most of the workers who lost jobs in housing construction were subsequently reemployed in other fields. It wasn't until October 2009 that unemployment soared to 10.1%, with job losses spread out across almost all sectors of the economy.

Indeed, the financial crisis did have its roots in the housing bubble, and there were consequent systemic failures of financial institutions, yet for some odd reason this situation did not set off alarm bells at the Fed until much too late.

There is a world of difference between a proximate cause and the ultimate cause.

Bottom Line: monetary policy failed to predict the problem and the Fed did not respond soon enough.

Fallacy of the "Blame Game"

The assumptions of the first narrative have dominated politics and have led to the QRM remedy.

Thus it is that we have this statement from Mr. Frank:

"I am disappointed at this revolt against risk retention that was so clearly at the center of this."

"All the other problems we had ... they all centered on the system for selling to other people loans that shouldn't have been made in the first place."

"It's simply not possible with any conceivable number of regulators to monitor every loan. If the people making the loans do not have an incentive not to lend to people who can't repay, there is no way we will prevent those kinds of loans from being made." (My emphasis.)

That sweeping statement is certainly not supported by the facts. I have discussed this fallacy of the "blame game" in detail elsewhere, for instance in my three-part series on the Dodd-Frank legislation.

Yet the "revolt" is not just coming from lenders. Consumer advocacy groups want to ensure homeownership for qualified borrowers among low and middle income families, without having to be turned away due to a market that has been deincentivized from lending to them.

Nell and the Horse

Maybe there was a really good reason why Nell preferred to show her gratitude to the Horse, rather than to drape herself around Dudley Do-Right's neck in gleeful appreciation and unbounded thanks.

I wonder if you could suggest what Nell's reason might have been.

What do you think?

Please feel free to comment!

Jonathan Foxx is the President and Managing Director of Lenders Compliance Group.

Ability-to-Repay: The Basics and a Chart

Commentary By: Jonathan Foxx
President and Managing Director of Lenders Compliance Group

On May 11, 2011, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) issued a proposed rule (Rule) to implement ability-to-repay requirements for closed-end residential loans.[i] The Rule implements Section 1411, Section 1412, and part of Section 1414 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).[ii] Comments on the Rule are to be received by no later than July 22, 2011.[iii] Having published the proposed Rule, the FRB retired from its involvement in this matter and handed over its rulemaking authority in the subject statute to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) on July 21, 2011.[iv]

As a revision to Regulation Z (the implementing regulation of the Truth in Lending Act), the Rule requires creditors to determine a consumer’s ability to repay a mortgage before making the loan and would also establish minimum mortgage underwriting standards. The Rule applies to any consumer credit transaction secured by a dwelling, except an open-end credit plan, timeshare plan, reverse mortgage, or temporary loan or ‘‘bridge’’ loan with a term of 12 months or less. [v] It appears that the Rule applies to purchase money and refinances, but not modifications of existing mortgages. There is a prohibition on prepayment penalties unless the mortgage is a prime, fixed rate, qualified mortgage - and unless the amount of the prepayment penalty is limited.

The Rule sets forth limits on prepayment penalties, the lengthening of the time creditors must retain records evidencing compliance with the ability-to-repay and prepayment penalty provisions, a prohibition to evading the Rule by structuring a closed-end extension of credit as an open-end plan, the delineation of new terms, procedures, and their resulting implications, and, very importantly, the means by which the Rule claims to offer tools to prevent likely default and mitigate risk for creditors and others who arrange, negotiate, or obtain an extension of mortgage credit for a consumer in return for compensation or other monetary gain.

Complying with the requirements of the ability-to-repay Rule is essential, because borrowers in a foreclosure proceeding will likely claim that the creditor failed to comply with the Rule as a defense by way of recoupment or set off, without regard to the normal statute of limitations under the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA).[vi] A violation of the Rule subjects the creditor to the TILA civil monetary penalties, plus the same enhanced civil remedies that apply to violations of TILA’s high-cost loan rules,[vii] and TILA also would authorize state attorneys general to bring actions for violations of the Rule for a period of up to three years.[viii]

A loan that is a covered transaction must qualify, among other things, as a “qualified mortgage” if the creditor wishes to include a prepayment penalty in the loan.

The Rule provides a presumption of compliance with the ability-to-repay requirements if the mortgage loan is a ‘‘qualified mortgage,’’ which does not contain certain risky features and limits points and fees on the loan. Furthermore, one feature of a higher-risk mortgage loan (i.e., subject to enhanced appraisal requirements under Dodd-Frank § 1471) is the loan may not be a qualified mortgage.[ix]

There are four (4) options to the determination of compliance with the Rule. The Rule refers to these origination options as “methods” and equips each method with a description of (1) limits on the loan features or term, (2) limits on points and fees, (3) underwriting requirements, and (4) payment calculations.

Option # 1: General Ability-to-Repay Standard

A creditor can meet the general ability-to-repay standard or test by:

• Considering and verifying the following eight (8) underwriting factors:

1. Income or assets relied upon in making the ability-to-repay determination;

2. Current employment status;

3. The monthly payment on the mortgage;

4. The monthly payment on any simultaneous mortgage;

5. The monthly payment for mortgage-related obligations;

6. Current debt obligations;

7. The monthly debt-to-income ratio, or residual income; and

8. Credit history.

• Underwriting the payment for an adjustable-rate mortgage based on the fully indexed rate.

Comment: This is an option that will be carefully reviewed by plaintiff’s counsel in an action to challenge a creditor’s compliance with the Rule. Consequently, enforcing compliance with the Rule will require fully vetted, tested, and continually updated, written procedures to govern every aspect of the application and underwriting process. Without clear and unambiguous policies and internal enforcement of appropriate policies and procedures, the creditor is allowing exposure to such a challenge. This option contains rigorous underwriting criteria and requires unmitigated, fact-based evaluations. Option # 1- the ability-to-repay test - is somewhat unstable (due to the invariant rigors of procedural compliance) though a relatively favorable methodology for the creditor, even if the loan flow process leaves very little room for error.

Option # 2: Qualified Mortgage (QM)

A creditor can originate a “qualified mortgage,” which provides special protection from liability. Two alternative definitions of a “qualified mortgage” are being considered by the CFPB:

Alternative # 1: Provides a legal safe harbor and defines a “qualified mortgage” as a mortgage for which:

· The loan does not contain negative amortization, interest-only payments, or a balloon payment, or a loan term exceeding 30 years;

· The total points and fees do not exceed three (3%) percent of the total loan amount;

· The income or assets relied upon in making the ability-to-repay determination are considered and verified;[x] and,

· The underwriting of the mortgage (a) is based on the maximum interest rate that may apply in the first five years, (b) uses a payment scheduled that fully amortizes the loan over the loan term, and (c) takes into account any mortgage-related obligations.

Alternative # 2: Provides a rebuttable presumption of compliance and would define a “qualified mortgage” as including the criteria listed under Alternative # 1 (above) as well as additional underwriting requirements from the general ability-to-repay standard (see Option # 1). In any event, under Alternative # 2, the creditor would also have to consider and verify:

· The consumer’s employment status;

· The monthly payment for any simultaneous mortgage;

· The consumer’s current debt obligations;

· The monthly debt-to-income ratio or residual income; and

· The consumer’s credit history.

Comment: Two alternatives are given: in Alternative # 1, to obtain a legal safe harbor, the creditor must consider and verify the borrower’s current or reasonably expected income or assets to determine the borrower’s repayment ability; and, in Alternative # 2, to obtain a rebuttable presumption of compliance, the creditor must consider and verify the borrower’s current or reasonably expected income or assets (i.e., other than the value of the dwelling in question), the borrower’s current employment status (assuming the creditor relies on employment income), the borrower’s monthly payment on any simultaneous loan, the borrower’s current debt obligations, the borrower’s monthly DTI or residual income, and the borrower’s credit history. It should be noted that the second alternative is for the most part similar to the ability-to-repay test.

Ability-to-Repay: Regulating or Underwriting? Part II

Jonathan Foxx is the President and Managing Director of Lenders Compliance Group.

Click below to download my article:

ABILITY-TO-REPAY:

REGULATING OR UNDERWRITING?

Part II

It has been published in the National Mortgage Professional Magazine - July 2011.

I am providing this article to you as a courtesy, for your personal use. I hope you enjoy it.

Please feel free to contact me at any time.

EXCERPT # 1

It seems to me that the imposition of an ability-to-repay requirement as a regulatory mandate is an admission that market forces cannot discipline lenders or incentivize lenders to act in their own self-interest. 

This is an obvious shift in liabilities, because this mandate shifts the burden of compliance to the lenders in order to assure that their contractually bound borrowers can pay back their loans. Parties to any contract can become adversaries! 

In other words, the relationship between the creditor and the borrower is innately affected and extensively undermined by this Rule, inasmuch as it imposes a new kind of theory for a regulatory framework and, in my estimation, infantilizes lenders by making them comply with a regulator's ad hoc way of rationing the extension of credit.

ABILITY-TO-REPAY:

REGULATING OR UNDERWRITING?

Part II

EXCERPT # 2

If the rationing of credit is meted out through this regulatory construct, it can be legitimately asserted as well that lenders are not arms-length, contractual counterparties; that is, lenders now will have a duty to assess a prospective borrower's ability to repay, irrespective of collateral value and securitization.

This change in the dynamics between and the inherent, due diligence tension among the parties to a residential mortgage transaction raise serious issues about the systemic consequences soon to be engendered.

ABILITY-TO-REPAY:

REGULATING OR UNDERWRITING?

Part II

Ability-to-Repay: Regulating or Underwriting? (Magazine Article)

COMMENTARY: by JONATHAN FOXX

Jonathan Foxx, former Chief Compliance Officer of two publicly traded financial institutions, is President and Managing Director of Lenders Compliance Group, the nation’s first full-service, mortgage risk management firm in the country.

I think you may be interested in reading my article in the June 2011 edition of National Mortgage Professional Magazine, entitled:

Ability-to-Repay: Regulating or Underwriting?

The article is Part I of a two-part magazine series.

As you may know, on May 11, 2011, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) issued a proposed rule (Rule) to implement ability-to-repay requirements for closed-end residential loans.

The Rule implements Section 1411, Section 1412, and part of Section 1414 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010.  Comments on the Rule are to be received by no later than July 22, 2011. 

But, having published the proposed Rule, the FRB will soon retire from its involvement in this matter, because it will hand over its rulemaking authority in the subject statute to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) on July 21, 2011.

Thus, the promulgation of the final Rule will be under the aegis of the CFPB.

In this article, I explore some of the salient features of this Rule, noting particularly that, as a revision to Regulation Z (the implementing regulation of the Truth in Lending Act), it requires creditors to determine a consumer's ability to repay a mortgage before making the loan and would also establish minimum mortgage underwriting standards.

The Rule applies to any consumer credit transaction secured by a dwelling, except an open-end credit plan,  timeshare plan, reverse mortgage, or temporary loan or ''bridge'' loan with a term of 12 months or less. It includes a closed-end home improvement loan on a vacation residence.

It appears that the Rule applies to purchase money and refinances, but not modifications of existing mortgages.

There is a prohibition on prepayment penalties unless the mortgage is a prime, fixed rate, qualified mortgage, and unless the amount of the prepayment penalty is limited.

As a courtesy, I am sharing this magazine article with you. I hope you enjoy reading it! 

Excerpt # 1

Complying with the requirements of the ability-to-repay Rule is essential, because borrowers in a foreclosure proceeding will likely claim that the creditor failed to comply with the Rule as a defense by way of recoupment or set off, without regard to the normal statute of limitations under the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA). 

A violation of the Rule subjects the creditor to the TILA civil monetary penalties, plus the same enhanced civil remedies that apply to violations of TILA's high-cost loan rules, and TILA also would authorize state attorneys general to bring actions for violations of the Rule for a period of up to three years.

Excerpt # 2

A loan that is a covered transaction must qualify, among other things, as a "qualified mortgage" (QM) if the creditor wishes to include a prepayment penalty in the loan.

The Rule provides a presumption of compliance with the ability-to-repay requirements if the mortgage loan is a ''qualified mortgage,'' which does not contain certain risky features and limits points and fees on the loan.

Furthermore, one feature of a higher-risk mortgage loan (i.e., subject to enhanced appraisal requirements under Dodd-Frank § 1471) is the loan may not be a QM.  (Under Dodd-Frank § 941, a "qualified residential mortgage" may not be broader in scope than a QM as defined in the Rule.)