Whistleblowers and Bounty Hunters

Americans have often had an ambivalent view of whistleblowers. When we feel that the whistleblowing serves some righteous cause, the whistleblower's actions are worthy of a medal; but when the whistleblower's cause is considered to mask self-aggrandizement, then we often contend that some jail time might be a more suitable reward, whatever the cause. Still, one person's justification for such actions may be castigated by another person as an act of perfidy.

In a rather morally twisted way, recent law has combined the act of whistleblowing with the remuneration of bounty hunting, the latter being yet another concerning happenstance of American ambivalence.

Let's call this new ethical imperative the "Dope for Dough" compact.

In this article:

• A Snitch In Time Saves Crime
• If You See Something, Say Something
• Welcome to the Office of the Whistleblower
• Bounty Hunter
• Tips, Complaints and Referrals
• Anonymity More-or-Less
• Preventing Retaliation More-or-Less
• First Do No Harm

A Snitch In Time Saves Crime

Being a snitch is not exactly the kind of job position somebody must apply for, even in these days of high unemployment. It's not a career opportunity. A snitch doesn't want to be a snitch, hates snitching, and would rather not have to snitch at all. Being a snitch does not bestow a badge of honor! There are no annual conferences for snitchers. A snitch is not born a snitch; something has to happen to make a snitch snitch.

Often, the stakes for snitching are very high. Being a snitch means subjecting oneself to potential ostracism, being fired, not being hired, jail time, and even community time (yes, courts have held that "community service" may be a proxy for prison time). Snitchers know that whenever people pass them by, there will be fingers pointed at them and breathless whispers behind their backs about the supposed damage done by, or the great good achieved through, their snitching. Snitching has a wake all its own and the snitcher can never get out of it, whatsoever the tattletale tattled.

The list of snitch martyrdom is long and, depending on the results and society's comfort zone, contains patriots and traitors, saints and the damned, reformists and reactionaries, the sempiternal loyalists and the double-crossing turncoat. Even if the weaseling betrayer squeals the unvarnished truth, the very act of making manifest the heretofore hidden may bring with it many dangers impinging on the tipster's physical, let alone social, survival.

If You See Something, Say Something!

We constantly hear, "if you see something, say something." Implied in that statement is the moral judgment that we do know when something is wrong and when something is right, and, knowing that difference, when we know something wrong is happening, we should share such knowledge with somebody else. The phrase does not say, "if you see something, say something, and if you do we'll pay you for the information." It does not say, "if you see something, say something, but if you do you will put yourself and perhaps all of your loved ones at personal risk." And it does not say, "if you see something, say something, but if you do you may go to jail or you may not." Finally, it does not say, "if you see something, say something, though if you do we will ignore what you have to say and nobody will ever know something wrong happened."

The instinct for self-preservation is strong. Especially strong in a stoolie! This is obviously why a recent study shows that 78 percent of Americans said they would report something wrong only if they could be anonymous informants, be assured of evading retaliation, and nevertheless get a reward for information, whether such information was pilfered, pinched, purloined, or professed.

Pity the poor snitch! So misunderstood, often the butt of ridicule, and only occasionally appreciated for the grumbling sacrifice of life and liberty. But now a new era of gratitude, tribute, and prestige has begun for the deep throated canary that yearns to sing.

Welcome to the Office of the Whistleblower

Henceforth, we will need to replace the term snitch with a new title, the "whistleblower," and appoint an overseer to protect the whistleblower's rights, prevent retaliation, and offer remuneration for blowing the whistle and assisting with any investigation or judicial or administrative action that follows from the information thereby obtained.

Section 924(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank) directs the Security and Exchange Commission (Commission) to establish a separate office within the Commission to administer and to enforce the Section 21F provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). On February 18, 2011, the Commission appointed an overseer or Chief, Sean X. McKessy, to head the newly-created Office of the Whistleblower in the Division of Enforcement (Whistleblower's Office). Chief McKessy is looking for a Deputy Chief, and there are several attorneys among the staff.

The ostensible purpose of the Whistleblower's Office is to provide assistance to a whistleblower who knows of possible securities law violations, such as identifying possible fraud and other violations, much earlier than might otherwise have been possible. The result, presumably, will be to minimize the harm to investors, preserve confidence in capital markets, and hold accountable those responsible for unlawful conduct.

Bounty Hunter

For remunerating the whistleblower, the Commission is authorized by Congress to provide monetary awards to eligible individuals who come forward with "high-quality original information" that leads to a Commission enforcement action in which over $1,000,000 in sanctions is ordered. The range for awards is between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions collected (which I will term the Bounty Fee).

This Bounty Fee of 10% to 30% is particularly robust, compared to the usual 10% (or less) of bail collected these days by bounty hunters. Of course, the whistleblower's Bounty Fee is not quite the same as the fee paid to a bounty hunter for capturing a fugitive outlaw. Bounty hunters are usually employed by bail bondsmen. But there is, shall we say, a resemblance.

Dodd-Frank Act – Reformation and Regulations

Part I of a Three-Part Series on Financial Reform Legislation
By: Jonathan Foxx, President and Managing Director 
Published in National Mortgage Professional Magazine
First Published: August 2010

Who’s In Charge Here?

I never blame myself when I'm not hitting.
I just blame the bat and if it keeps up, I change bats.
After all, if I know it isn't my fault that I'm not hitting, how can I get mad at myself?
Yogi Berra

Let’s admit it: the tendency to pretend we’re holding somebody or some entity “accountable” for the mortgage crisis, when we’re really not, is just a fashionable avoidance of that unpleasant word: “blame.” Once that label sticks, it’s on to dealing with the nasty culprits! Blaming is purported to be cowardly, even passive; and being held accountable is lauded as proactive and high-minded. So, the word “accountable” is now in vogue, instead of “blame.” Frankly, the word “accountable” in today’s world is merely politically-correct, euphemistic Newspeak for the fact that “you know you did wrong, I know you did wrong, everybody in the world knows you did wrong, but you’ll pay no penalties whatsoever for doing anything wrong.”

Although the tone-at-the-top mantra of the Obama Administration is “let’s look forward and not look back,” or the Bush Administration’s tactic of retroactively making lawful what was heretofore unlawful (or unconstitutional) remains beyond contest, or the on-going trading of opaque financial instruments seems to continue in an entirely unregulated market, or many government departments and agencies are still remaining reactive at best during a crisis – in the Newspeak of our times, we are assured of accountability, which now apparently means there’s nobody to blame at all, nobody held responsible for the meltdown, nobody to put in jail. Everybody’s free to go and, we’re admonished, it doesn’t do any good to blame anybody for anything, since we can’t fix this mortgage mess unless and until we all can get along, be bi-partisan, be post-partisan, and look to the better angels of our nature!

Accountability these days seems to mean no adverse consequences to the perpetrator and no blame for anybody. If you find a person to blame, that person’s not accountable; and if you find somebody who is accountable, that person is not to blame. While lobbyists, dogmatists, political catechists, and ideologues just make stuff up, they’ve found the culprit for sure, those bad actors portrayed as directly and indirectly culpable, the rapacious mortgage originators: they certainly should be blamed, reined in, re-regulated, and de-incentivized for having largely contributed to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression!

Portraying mortgage originators as the culprit is a politically useful narrative meant for the consumption of low information voters; but, as we’ll see, there is plenty of blame in this game and, to date, not much real, old-fashioned accountability – the kind that has real world consequences – except, of course, for those who originated the mortgages in the first place.

Results are what you expect.
Consequences are what you get.
Anonymous

On Tuesday, June 22, 2010, a Conference Committee met in Room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, in Washington, to reconcile Senate and House versions of H.R. 4173, known as the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. That bill ostensibly was drafted to create a new consumer financial protection “watchdog,” bring about an end to “too big to fail” bailouts, set up an early warning system to “predict and prevent” the next crisis, and bring transparency and accountability to exotic instruments such as derivatives. Led by Representative Barnie Frank (D-MA) and Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), the conferees reviewed and voted on new regulations as well as additions, deletions, and revisions of existing regulations.

The list of new regulations and amendments to existing regulations, consisting of thousands of pages, read like the attenuated, convoluted, cross-tabulated Index Section of a Whodunit’s Guide to the Perplexed. Seated around a large, rectangular dais, the Committee’s politicians called one another out, speechified, postured, and legislated to protect their respective constituencies, absolved themselves of ever having allowed their own politics to contribute to the financial crisis, while the Clerk recorded votes, staff members raced around, and lawyers scurried about with various and sundry red-lined versions of financial reform legislation.

On Friday, June 25, 2010, all the backroom, sub rosa, deals were ironed out, all the special interests had their way or lost their sway, and the votes tallied up mostly across party lines: Democrats – Aye; Republicans – Nay. The Ayes had it! Congratulations filled the conference chamber, Representatives and Senators praised one another, staff high-fived and hugged one another, and President Obama hailed the legislation as the “toughest financial reforms since the ones we passed in the aftermath of the Great Depression."[1] Now only House and Senate approval was needed,[2] and thence the President’s multi-pen signature, to become the law – which it did on July 21, 2010, just before noon. The legislation, now known as the Dodd-Frank Act, became the law of the land.

Among the many features of the legislation, the following was gaveled in:

· Requiring Lenders to Ensure a Borrower's Ability to Repay: Establishing a “simple federal standard” (sic) for all home loans to ensure that borrowers can repay the loans they are sold.

· Prohibiting Unfair Lending Practices: Prohibiting the financial incentives for subprime loans that “encourage lenders to steer borrowers into more costly loans,” including the bonuses known as yield spread premiums that “lenders pay to brokers to inflate the cost of loans.”

· Penalizing Irresponsible Lending: Issuing monetary penalties to lenders and mortgage brokers who don’t comply with new standards by holding them accountable for as high as three-year’s interest payments and damages plus attorney’s fees (if any), and, protects borrowers against foreclosure for violations of the new standards.

· Expanding Consumer Protections for High-Cost Mortgages: Expanding the protections available under federal rules on high-cost loans -- lowering the interest rate and the points and fee triggers that define high cost loans.

· Mandating Additional Mortgage Disclosures: Requiring lenders to disclose the maximum a consumer could pay on a variable rate mortgage, with a warning that payments will vary based on interest rate changes.

· Establishing an Office of Housing Counseling: Establishing a special office within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to “boost homeownership and rental housing” counseling.

And, most significantly, the legislation’s centerpiece: the creation of a new agency, tucked into the Treasury and clearly under its purview:

· Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau): Creating a regulatory and supervisory authority to examine and enforce consumer protection regulations with respect to all mortgage-related businesses, large non-bank financial companies, and banks and credit unions with greater than $10 billion in assets.

Some of these policies have been worthy of consideration, although others seem to be the result of reactive, political triage, and short-sighted (if not also short-term) fixes, without having given much thought to consequences, unintended or otherwise, on the consumer and the mortgage industry.

The Spinmeisters have already begun their Ode to Financial Reform! In this article, the first in a series of articles on the “landmark” legislation, we will un-spin and unpack the new law and seek to learn more about exactly what the Dodd-Frank Act (Act) has wrought for the mortgage industry.

Housing bubble? What housing bubble?

“Homes that are occupied may see an ebb and flow
in the price at a certain percentage level,
but you’re not going to see the collapse that you see
when people talk about a bubble.”
Barnie Frank (D-MA) June 27, 2005[3]

The Act spans to 2,319 pages and affects almost every aspect of the financial services industry in the United States. Just the sheer size of the Act is indicative of the complexity and detailed, interlocking, regulatory authorities and mandates involved.[4] Compare this with the 31 pages of the Federal Reserve Act which became law almost one hundred years ago. The law’s size also should be taken to reflect the enormous increase in regulations in the intervening years that must be factored into or subsumed under the Act. Consider the following chart:[5]

 

Major Financial Legislation
Number of Pages

Perhaps it would ultimately be worth all the effort put into such a prodigious and voluminous legislation if its purported objective – prevention of another financial crisis – could be expected to result from enforcement of this law. Unfortunately, it won’t!

The Act does very little to prevent the next financial crisis because, among other things, it side-steps the “too big to fail” issues, for instance, by not imposing size limits on any financial institution; offers virtually no resolution to the dysfunctional operations of the GSEs, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae; and, fails to reinstate the Glass-Steagall Act’s wall of separation between “utility” and “casino” banking. Although it will not prevent the next financial tsunami or Black Swan,[6] implementation of the regulatory requirements of the Act will dramatically and permanently affect the way residential mortgages are originated in this country.

And if ineptitude, complacency, and failure to implement existing regulations were hallmarks of the regulatory environment prior to the Act, how will we know in advance how things are going with all these new regulatory requirements? After all, thanks to an unnoticed provision in the Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is now declaring itself exempt from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, one of the bulwarks of government transparency. Perhaps other government entities involved in the Act’s implementation will stake out similar positions.[7] Of course, there are periodic reports to Congress on many issues and programs; however, Congress is the domicile of politicians and they often find ways to underplay failures and exaggerate successes.

Residential Mortgage Loan Provisions
- New Rules -

 

Analyzing this vast financial and mortgage reform legislation is a daunting prospect. Over this series of articles, we will highlight many of the Act’s components. The articles in this series on the Dodd-Frank Act are meant to provide an overview. However, this legislation is extremely detailed and extensive. Therefore, for guidance and risk management support, I recommend that you consult a residential mortgage compliance professional in developing policies and procedures to implement the Act’s requirements.

Essentially, the following matrix provides a generalized outline of the salient provisions of the Act that directly affect residential mortgage loans originations.

For the remainder of this article, we will be reviewing the Mortgage Loan Regulatory Provisions and, where relevant, its integration into other parts of the Dodd-Frank Act.