CREATORS OF THE COMPLIANCE TUNE-UP®

AARMR | ABA | ACAMS | ALTA | ARMCP | IAPP | IIA | MBA | MERS® | MISMO | NAMB

Showing posts with label Robosigning. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Robosigning. Show all posts

Monday, November 14, 2011

New Mortgage Servicing Practices

On August 10, 2010, the New York State Banking Department issued new regulations that address the business practices of mortgage loan servicers and establish additional consumer protections for homeowners.

Part 419 of the Superintendent's Regulations, which went into effect on October 1, 2010, were a follow-up to the adoption of Part 418 in July 2009, which established standards and procedures for the registration of mortgage loan servicers in New York. The regulations implement certain provisions of the Mortgage Lending Reform Law enacted in 2008 to address the foreclosure crisis and establish greater consumer protections for subprime and high-cost home loans.

Recently, Benjamin M. Lawsky, the Superintendent of Financial Services of New York's Department of Financial Services and Banking Department, announced that the Department had entered into two agreements with certain servicers to implement new servicing practices. The Department considers these new servicing requirements to be landmark changes, and they form the basis of the new Mortgage Servicing Practices.

In the first instance, Superintendent Lawsky announced on September 1, 2011 that Goldman Sachs Bank, Ocwen Financial Corp, and Litton Loan Servicing LP agreed to adhere to the new Mortgage Servicing Practices. The agreement, entitled "Agreement on Mortgage Servicing Practices," was required by the Department as a condition to allowing Ocwen's acquisition of Litton, the Goldman Sachs mortgage servicing subsidiary. With the Litton acquisition, Ocwen's mortgage servicing entity, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC becomes the 12th largest servicer in the nation. The servicer has 60 days from the date of the acquisition to implement the provisions and requirements of the Mortgage Servicing Practices.

In the second instance, Superintendent Lawsky announced on November 10, 2011 that Morgan Stanley and its mortgage servicer Saxon, American Home Mortgage Servicing, and Vericrest Financial had agreed to the new Mortgage Servicing Practices.

The changes are substantial and clearly the Department is committed to enforcing them. Maybe you would suggest other changes. In any event, these servicing requirements will benefit both the consumer and the mortgage industry.

It is likely that these new Mortgage Servicing Practices will become a model in other states.

The following is a brief review of these new practices.
OVERVIEW
The Department has consumer protection concerns relating to practices "highlighted in the media" that have been prevalent in the mortgage servicing industry generally, including but not limited to, (1) the practice of "Robo-signing," (2) referring to affidavits in foreclosure proceedings that falsely attest that the signer has personal knowledge of the facts presented therein and/or were not notarized in accordance with state law; (3) weak internal controls and oversight that may have compromised the accuracy of foreclosure documents; (4) unfair and improper practices in connection with loss mitigation, including improper denials of loan modifications; and, (5) imposition of improper fees by servicers, among others.
OUTLINE OF PRACTICES
-Document Execution and Accuracy of Documentation
-Ownership of Note, Foreclosures
-Quality Assurance and Audits
-Oversight of Third Party Vendors
-Staffing
-Training
-Notices, Single Point of Contact and Modifications for Transferred Servicing Files
-Borrower Communication
-Independent Evaluation of Loan Modification Denials
-Restrictions on Dual Tracking
-Application of Payments
-Servicing Fees
-Force-Placed Insurance
-Compliance with Federal and State Law
PROHIBITED PRACTICES
  • "Robo-signing," where servicer staff signed affidavits stating they reviewed loan documents when they had not actually done so.
  • Weak internal controls and oversight that compromise the accuracy of foreclosure documents.
  • Referring borrowers to foreclosure at the same time as those borrowers are attempting to obtain modifications of their mortgages or other loss mitigation.
  • Improper denials of loan modifications.
  • Failing to provide borrowers with access to a single customer service representative, resulting in delays or failure of the loss mitigation process.
  • Imposition of improper fees by servicers.
SPECIFIC CHANGES
1) End Robo-signing and impose staffing and training requirements that will prevent Robo-signing.
2) Require servicers to withdraw any pending foreclosure actions in which filed affidavits were Robo-signed or otherwise not accurate.
3) End "dual tracking", for instance referring a borrower to foreclosure while the borrower is pursuing loan modification or loss mitigation, and prohibit foreclosures from advancing while denial of a borrower's loan modification is under an independent review, which is also required by the agreements.
4) Provide a dedicated single point of contact representative for all borrowers seeking loss mitigation or in foreclosure so borrowers are able to speak to the same person who knows their file every time they call.
5) Require servicers to ensure that any force-placed insurance be reasonably priced in relation to claims incurred, and prohibit force-placing insurance with an affiliated insurer.
6) Impose more rigorous pleading requirements in foreclosure actions to ensure that only parties and entities possessing the legal right to foreclose can sue borrowers.
7) For borrowers found to have been wrongfully foreclosed, require servicers to ensure that their equity in the property is returned, or, if the property was sold, compensate the borrower.
8) Impose new standards on servicers for application of borrowers' mortgage payments to prevent layering of late fees and other servicer fees and use of suspense accounts in ways that compounded borrower delinquencies and defaults.
9) Require servicers to strengthen oversight of foreclosure counsel and other third party vendors, and impose new obligations on servicers to conduct regular reviews of foreclosure documents prepared by counsel and to terminate foreclosure attorneys whose document practices are problematic or who are sanctioned by a court.

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

GMAC: Spectral Hand of "Robosigning"

COMMENTARY by JONATHAN FOXX

jonathan-foxx

Jonathan Foxx is a former Chief Compliance Officer of two publicly traded financial institutions, and the President & Managing Director of Lenders Compliance Group, the nation’s first full-service, mortgage risk management firm in the country.

Line-Webpage

This past Friday, January 14, 2011, GMAC decided to cancel certain foreclosure actions in Maryland.

At a time in which foreclosure actions are expected to accelerate 20% in 2011, and 2.87 million properties were the subject of default notices, auctions, or repossession in 2010 (a 2% gain from 2009), and banks seized more than 1 million homes in 2010 (up 14% from 2009), the impact of the spectral hand of so-called "robosigning" has now apparently reached a new threshold.

Separator-Glow

GMAC and Maryland Foreclosures

Separator-Glow

In a move that should place renewed emphasis on loss mitigation and further curtail the headlong rush to foreclosure processing, GMAC has decided to cancel foreclosure proceedings on 250 properties in Maryland. There have been reports of perhaps 1,000 foreclosures affected and possibly many more.

The ostensible cause of this retreat is due to defective affidavits, executed by one Jeffrey Stephan, a "robo-signer" who has attested to, among other things, the authenticity of foreclosure documents without having had any knowledge about them.

By this point, we all should know the sorry story of robo-signing that has facilitated the massive foreclosure proceedings by banks. GMAC's decision was brought on by a class action handled through the University of Maryland Consumer Protection Clinic and Civil Justice, Inc., a nonprofit. Though there were other aspects tried in the case, the central position of the case argued that any foreclosure action which used Jeffrey Stephan as the "signer" was essentially illegitimate, and therefore must be dismissed.

I should point out that GMAC is not the only recipient of this argument: although not yet a settled matter, the University of Maryland Consumer Protection Clinic and Civil Justice also want dismissed any foreclosure actions with affidavits from Xee Moua, Wells Fargo employee and admitted "robosignor," who stated in a sworn deposition in a Florida case that she had signed foreclosure-related papers on behalf of the bank and that the only information she verified was whether her name and title appeared correctly on the relevant documents.

Stephan estimated that he signed 10,000 documents a month; Moua claimed to sign at the rate of as much as 500 documents each day.

Separator-Glow

Mediation

Separator-Glow

In Maryland, a judicial foreclosure state, GMAC will refile these cases, but will be required to do so under new laws that went into effect on July 1, 2010. Certain features of these laws probably should be adopted in those states where state law itself provides a means to implement them.

Pursuant to these new Maryland laws, for instance, banks seeking to foreclose must demonstrate in filings that they reviewed and considered foreclosure alternatives, and provided specific notices to the borrowers. Importantly, these laws permit borrowers to be eligible to pursue court supervised mediation. Obviously, this law will change the timing, method and cost for conducting residential foreclosures in Maryland.

So the foreclosure process, as I've mentioned in previous Commentaries, is not going to cease permanently; for the most part, it will slow down for awhile, regroup, gather up its standing, reinforce its procedural integrity, and then restart.

Here's a good article on the Maryland controversy by a fine reporter who has been tracking this story with clarity for some time.

Separator-Glow

Servicing and Foreclosure

Separator-Glow

All this brings me to remarks that will be made today in an "Opening Address by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair" at the Summit on Residential Mortgage Servicing for the 21st Century, an event sponsored in DC by the Mortgage Bankers Association.

In her prepared remarks, Mrs. Bair states that "chaos in mortgage servicing and foreclosure is introducing a dangerous new uncertainty into this fragile market," and that the "persistent adversary has been inertia in the servicing and foreclosure practices applied to problem loans." Her speech centers on the "mortgage servicing problem."

I think this observation of hers pretty much sums up the situation:

"The mortgage crisis also has revealed a fatal flaw in this unbundling of the mortgage-lending process: the misalignment of incentives between the various parties and specialists involved. We have dramatically underappreciated the potential for what economists call "principal-agent" problems arising from misaligned incentives. Mortgage brokers and lenders had little or no incentive to worry about whether borrowers could repay their mortgages. Neither did the investment banks putting together securitizations and CDOs." (My Emphasis.)

Separator-Glow

Some Suggestions

Separator-Glow

Essentially, Mrs. Bair suggests a clearly delineated loss mitigation approach that enhances mediation. Perhaps this realization is dawning belatedly on her and the servicers part, but at least it is being discussed in some way.

The suggestions she outlines are well worth considering:

1) In order to remedy failures endemic to the largest mortgage servicers ... [there should be] "enforceable requirements that will significantly improve opportunities for homeowners to avoid foreclosure."

2) Servicers must commit to adequate staffing and training for effective loss mitigation ... [and] "establish industry benchmarks - based on a maximum number of delinquent loans per representative - and insist on a minimum standard of training to ensure that staff are up-to-date on the latest loss-mitigation programs."

3) [Servicers should] "expedite the loan modification process and help clear the market, [looking] for opportunities to greatly simplify loan-modification offers in exchange for waivers of claims."

4) Regarding second lien holders interests competing with first lien holder interests, "as part of any resolution of claims regarding large servicers, a fixed formula should be established to govern the treatment of first and second mortgages when the servicer or its affiliate owns the second lien" [a formula which should, at minimum] "require that the subordinate lien be reduced pro-rata to any change in the first mortgage."

5) There should be an "independent review of loss-mitigation denials" and "borrowers should have the right to appeal any adverse denial of a loan modification request to an independent party who has the proper information to conduct an immediate review and the power to correct erroneous determinations."

6) "Weak practices" in handling title documentation must also "cease" by assuring that banks and other servicers will be required to "foreclose in their own names instead of allowing MERS to foreclose [and] provide complete chain of title and note transfer history in the notice of default."

7) Settlements should eliminate "incentive payments to law firms for speedy foreclosures, as well as the use of lost-note affidavits, except where the servicer has made good faith efforts to obtain the note" [and such settlements] should "prohibit foreclosure sales when a loan is in loss mitigation, except in specific situations where delay would disadvantage the investor, violate existing contracts, or reward a borrower acting in bad faith."

Separator-Glow

Foreclosure Claims Commission

Separator-Glow

Mrs. Bair asserts a rather bold suggestion - one I have heard much about over the last few years, but now note that it has made its way into quotidian discourse: the creation of a foreclosure claims commission.

According to Mrs. Bair, this commission would be "modeled on the BP or 9/11 claims commissions, [and] could be set up and funded by servicers to address complaints of homeowners who have wrongly suffered foreclosure through servicer errors."

I think this will likely be resisted politically, legally, and financially for a number of reasons, but I'll let Mrs. Bair speak:

"Many in the servicing industry will resist a settlement such as this because it would impose much of the immediate financial cost on the major servicers themselves. But this would be short-sighted. The fact is, every time servicers have delayed needed changes to minimize their short-term costs, they have seen a deepening of the crisis that has cost them - and the rest of us - even more."

Separator-Glow

Resolutions

Separator-Glow

Somewhere in the interstitial fields of loss mitigation and foreclosure actions a resolution must be found.

And must be found soon!

Separator-Glow

What do you think?

I would welcome your comments.
Please feel free to email me at any time.

Action Button Image 1

Post Separator-2-LCG